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Abstract 
 
The following investigation is intended to determine how the large-cap US 
multinational corporation was further advanced during the pivotal years of 1895-1913 by 
a leading private unincorporated institution—House of Morgan. Historical review and 
assessment focused on the broader US society, government, monetary landscape, the 
House of Morgan, leading large cap US multinationals; looking at both the key 
organizations and underlying people in power. The report framework focuses upon the 
development of the US super structure within which all major companies work down to 
the way actual institutions organize economic assets in the form of a multinational 
corporation. Questions that have been considered include: how was business conducted 
globally with so little formal mechanisms in place, the importance of the various forms of 
capital for business, and the various roles politics played in business development. Other 
areas include how owners and managers were effectively separated, how these same 
companies were able to branch out its product offering and the importance of providing 
corporate incentives. 
The House of Morgan cooperated with leading merchant banks, governments, 
foundations in developing an over-arching environment that was better adapted to the 
realities of the recent agricultural, industrial, and transportation revolutions that had 
brought about an integrated world. To organize economic assets in a more efficient and 
stable manner, large-cap multinationals were the preferred alternative, with a wave of 
consolidation across industries, underpinned by the pristine Morgan name. Strong board 
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presence, interlocking corporate representation, active role in strategic planning, and 
management selection ensured that not only were new corporations molded in the design 
of the House of Morgan but also that they would stay committed to the far-reaching 
objectives. 
The House of Morgan took on more than just a focus of increasing shareholder 
value. They were driven by lofty ambitions of providing comprehensive stability within 
society at large in a rapidly changing world. The partners of the House of Morgan 
families had for generations been at the vanguard for providing the highest level of 
leadership throughout society in areas including business, politics, finance, and religion. 
These leading families were instrumental in providing the backbone of American society 
including founding the US Republic, developing the most venerable education 
institutions, and providing a moral compass through religious revival movements. The 
House of Morgan would help bring about generally larger and more institutionalized 
solutions from preceding generations that were conducive for multinational corporations 
to operate within. This ranges from a US central bank, developing modern non-profits 
structure, and funding the transportation network making the world more integrated. In 
helping organize broader US society, the House of Morgan would interlock different 
subsystems, including finance, charity, and politics with business in promotion of a more 
harmonious, predictable and productive society. The House of Morgan development of 
leading US large-cap multinationals, including General Electric, International Harvester, 
International Mercantile Marine and US Steel illustrates how it not only provided for the 
macro landscape to operate within, but also developed the leading companies of the era.
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
There have been few events during human history that have fundamentally 
reshaped the world and have had a generational impact to the same extent as several 
“Revolutions” occurring first in Great Britain during the 18th and 19th century. Starting 
in the mid 18th century, the Agricultural Revolution was an immense step forward in 
increasing the quantity of food, quality of nutrients, and reducing the amount of labor 
required to toil the farmlands.1 The Industrial Revolution brought about the greatest 
economic change in history of the world before its time, with the sustained rapid increase 
in production and distribution starting in the late 18th century.2 A Transportation 
Revolution starting in the early 19th century helped conquer great distances through 
advances in canal building, railroad construction, and steamship utilization.3 The 
aforementioned trends allowed for an increase in population that was less tied to 
subsistence farming, having increased economic opportunities via factory work, the 
ability to transport goods across oceans with more centralized urban population centers—
supporting a more linked world. 
The integration of our world is truly one of the most powerful themes in history as 
it touches on all areas of our lives, from the way we think to how we earn a living. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1Mark Overton, “Re-Establishing the English Agricultural Revolution,” Agricultural History 
Review 44, no. 1 (1996):1. 
2Gregory Clark, A Farewell to Alms (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 231. 
3Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A History in Our Time (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 17. 
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Globalization has had strong historical roots dating back several thousand years, with 
convergence trends accelerating across social, cultural, political, and business lines.4 
Internationalization hastened in the latter part of the 19th century measured by key 
metrics, included foreign trade and overseas investment.5 While the world today 
continues to become more unified, it has been far from a linear line, with periods of deep 
intersection and wide disintegration in between. Many historians mark the first great 
wave of globalization in the modern era from 1870 to 1914.6 In fact, some would contend 
that the world is less globalized today versus a hundred years ago with less unification 
around key areas, including human migration, capital flows, ability to invest abroad and 
property rights, to name a few.7 
By the start of World War I, the United States was an economic superpower 
benefiting from globalization trends.8 Buoyant international trade from manufacturing 
was the key contributor to the growth—manufactured goods represented 20 percent of 
U.S. exports in 1890, rising sharply to roughly 50 percent by 1913.9 US large-cap 
multinationals were a leading driver of the manufacturing export growth, as they were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4Mauro F. Guillen, “Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key 
Debates in the Social Science Literature,” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (Aug., 2001): 236. 
5Ibid., 237. 
6Sisay Asefa, Globalization and International Development: Critical Issues of the 21st Century 
(Kalamazoo, MI: Western Michigan University, 2010), 6. 
7Geoffrey Jones, “Globalization,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business History, ed. Geoffrey 
Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 152. 
8Robert Fitzgerald, “Marketing and Distribution,” in The Oxford Handbook of Business History, 
ed. Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 401. 
9Douglas A. Irwin, “Explaining America’s Surge in Manufactured Exports, 1880-1913,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 85, no. 2 (2003): 364. 
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now the dominant business in organizing economic assets in the US. In fact, the largest 
100 US corporations controlled 40% of US industrial capital by 1905 after increasing 
their average size four times in just ten years given the great consolidation movement at 
the turn of the century and would continue to gain share in the years to come.10 The role 
of large-cap US multinationals was pivotal on multiple fronts, ranging from developing 
an infrastructure used for a more productive global economy such as telegraph stations 
and gas utilities11 to transferring more intangible benefits such as organization 
capabilities in running a multiunit operation across borders.12 These large multiunit 
organizations were also the principal coordinators of trade, investment, and knowledge 
abroad.13 Large-cap multinational corporations remain the dominant form to organize 
economic assets today with their investment continuing to grow faster compared with 
world exports or output.14 
One of the most powerful historical themes over the last few centuries has been 
the role of business in integrating economies. Leading business historians such as Alfred 
Chandler, Geoffrey Jones, and Mira Wilkins have been grasping with the development of 
the multinational, its societal impact and also tied these companies into larger themes 
such as globalization.15 The significance of the US multinational corporations becoming 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10Jeffery Barbour and David Bunting, “Interlocking Directorates in Large American Corporations, 
1896-1964,” Business History Review 45, no. 3 (Autumn, 1971): 317. 
11Jones, “Globalization,” 156. 
12Ibid., 145. 
13Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 285. 
14Ibid., 150. 
15Ibid., 142. 
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the dominant form of doing business at the turn of the 20th century has been looked at 
extensively, showcasing the evolution of the companies being the byproduct of rapidly 
expanding production, the great merger and acquisition wave, and effective organization 
in dealing with government regulation and laws, to name a few. The development of US 
large-cap multinationals has also been looked at with in-depth case studies discussing 
their singular evolution including works on Coca-Cola, Standard Oil, and US Steel. 
However, what has yet to receive adequate attention has been both the 
advancement of the large-cap US multinational corporation internal organization and 
external operating environment driven by an outside group of purposeful actors. My 
research question centers on how a leading private institution helped further develop both 
the large-cap US multinational corporation extrinsic global infrastructure and internal 
organization, focusing primarily during the years of 1895-1913. I selected the 1895-1913 
time frame, which saw the large-cap US multinational corporation further assert its role 
as the dominant form of business, increasingly taking on its current structure. I am 
attempting to fill that void left by previous scholars concentrating on a specific timeframe 
during which the large-cap US multinational came into greater prominence. The set of 
issues focuses on how a private institution helped develop the US multinational 
corporations internal business structure and also external operating environment. 
I focused on the leading US merchant banking firm who as by nature of its 
business, is deeply a part of the global economy macro structure and is also pivotal in 
individual large-cap corporate formation. Business scholars around the turn of the 20th 
century have near unanimity that merchant banks were the most influential on the broader 
economy among the various sectors and the most powerful in shaping other industries 
5 
!
!
 
within the US.16 Merchant banking was the most integrated industry with the rest of the 
corporate sectors as shown through various measures, including their dominant 
interlocking board representation.17 The most preeminent of private merchant bankers 
served effectively as the US central bank, financial ambassadors to leading foreign 
dignitaries, and facilitators of global trade. These same unincorporated institutions were 
chief in US’s large-scale corporate formation, from attracting necessary financial capital 
to placing individuals on the boards to overseeing management thereafter. 
The firm on which I choose to focus for this study within the world of private 
merchant banking, given its leading position within the global economy and in 
developing US large-cap corporations during the period was the venerable House of 
Morgan.18 The title of my investigation is: How the House of Morgan Cooperated to 
Develop the Large-Cap US Multinational Corporation, 1895-1913. My research intends 
to explore how a private organization is able to both help shape the macro framework for 
the large-cap corporations in which to operate and also to structure an organization to 
conduct business. The start of World War I was a watershed year for globalization that 
we still today have not yet replicated in many ways; as the preceding twenty years were 
instrumental in projecting one of the most integrated worlds we have ever seen. Neither 
the free markets nor the governments were the primary driver for booming trade and 
ample capital investment that was aiding in integrating the world, but multinational 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16Mark S. Mizruchi, “Relations Among Large American Corporations, 1904-1974,” Social Science 
History 7, no. 2, The American Corporate Network, 1815-1974 (Spring, 1983): 165. 
17Ibid., 173. 
18Jean Strouse, Morgan: American Financier (New York: Random House, 1999), 4. 
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firms.19 Understanding how the US large-cap multinational corporation formed, we get a 
considerably better grasp, all in all, of an economic framework of the world for the time. 
As the dominant profitable engine for the world’s largest economy by 1913, the society 
under which we lived had much to do with corporate key objectives and was shaped by 
their multilayered influence in the cultural, political, and social parts of society. The 
world at the turn of the 20th century, which was still profoundly influenced by the British 
Empire, its influence in the formation of the US large-cap multinational corporation, and 
broader macro environment, will be illuminated. Were the strategies employed in 
developing the large-cap US multinational corporation done in isolation within the 
financial industry or did it involve the effective use of cooperation of the larger whole 
societal structure are points on which I will elaborate. 
The progression of the US multinational corporation in the United States during 
the end of the nineteenth into the early twentieth century did not happen in a vacuum and 
can be best accessed through an interdisciplinary review within this report. This provides 
a simple external macro and internal corporate framework for assessing how the House of 
Morgan further developed the large-cap US multinational corporation. I will spend the 
first half of the research report elaborating on the macro infrastructure that provides the 
overarching framework for a functioning economy. First, fostering trust is essential as the 
ground floor from which to build a super structure. Governments are an important 
determining factor for what type of business structure will evolve as they set the rules of 
the land for how new organizations will be allowed to start/fail, and how they impact the 
flow of transactions through laws regulating trade both within and outside the nation. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism, 285. 
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monetary system is vital as it will determine how much financing will be raised, the 
nature of investors, and where will they invest. Lastly, I shall address the leading role 
London had to play in all aspects of US corporate development. 
In chapter two, I shall discuss what was the foundation that allowed the early 
20th-century economy to be remarkably integrated given little formal protections and 
information, the importance of social standing, the distinct ways an individual can 
enhance one’s position in society and shall give a backdrop as to why merchant banking 
possessed such a high barrier to entry. I shall provide a backdrop as to the reason for the 
need to develop the US multinational corporation in further support of a broader 
community of interests. In chapter three, I shall go over London’s importance on 
financial markets in the US, the major economic centers, how the House of Morgan was 
organized and its preceding illustrious history. I shall further seek to answer the role that 
cooperative finance played in developing the large-cap multinational corporation. In 
chapter four, I shall discuss how Washington’s political decisions locally and abroad 
influenced the development of the corporation, such as how regulation, tariff enactment 
or state incorporation laws affect the economic organization by companies. Given the 
scale and scope of the British Empire and its tight relationship with the United States and 
influence it had in shaping the US multinationals will be looked at as well. Who was the 
lender of last resort and why was the promotion of an integrated economy on sound 
currency important for business development will also be discussed. 
The second half of my investigation drills down to the other half of my 
framework: how the companies uniquely were structured to function in the global 
economy, discussing the ownership, operations and financing of the organizations. 
8 
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Broadly, for large-cap multinationals, the shareholders are the owners of the entities with 
the board of directors representing their interest. From a legal perspective, a multinational 
corporation is a separate legal entity that limits the liability of the owners while binding 
the company to the various contracts it enters under different jurisdictions globally. 
Large-cap US multinationals at the turn of the 20th century had multiple distinct product 
lines with a hierarchy of paid managers who tended to have little ownership in the 
company. The selected management team executed the board’s vision, and employees 
implemented management orders. Financing tended to come from external sources, such 
as local banks and for larger capital requirements international private merchant banks. 
The US large-cap multinational corporations at the turn of the 20th century increasingly 
conducted operations in more than one country. This can be accomplished by having 
production, retail or a wholly owned subsidiary, operating overseas. Organizations 
increasingly focused on employee relations, research and development, and their public 
image as well as progressively submitting financial information to internal and external 
decision makers. 
In chapters five and six, I will answer the question of how the House of Morgan 
was able to advance the structure of the actual large-cap organization and with specific 
case studies. In chapter five, I will seek to answer how the House of Morgan helped 
develop and the role it played in the US multinational corporation’s most enduring 
features. This includes how companies grow remarkably large with multiple different 
units, what strategy did companies use in expanding overseas, what role boards play in 
separation of owners and managers, why was reliable information so valuable for internal 
and external decision makers, what and why were new corporate incentives being 
9 
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developed. In chapter six, I shall go more in-depth on focused case studies of large-cap 
US multinationals, illuminating the questions I asked earlier, namely, how US Steel, 
International Harvester, General Electric and International Mercantile Marine were 
organized by the House of Morgan. In chapter seven, I will tie up the key themes of the 
report and elaborate on my central thesis. However, first in the next three chapters I will 
discuss how the House of Morgan garnered the necessary social, financial, and political 
capital throughout the broader society, which was instrumental in laying down an 
overarching framework for large-cap US multinationals in which to operate. 
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Chapter II 
House of Morgan Social and Cultural Capital 
 
The House of Morgan partners were possessors of nearly unmatched social and 
cultural capital in the United States. The aggregate reputation of the House of Morgan’s 
partners would directly correlate to the standing of the firm in the broader society, how 
much financial capital they could ultimately leverage for their clients and explain why 
industry barriers were untimely quite high in merchant banking. The typical Morgan 
partner family descended from wealthy origins in Great Britain centuries ago, grew up on 
the Eastern Seaboard, were Episcopalian, and if pursuing a college degree, did so 
overwhelmingly in Ivy League schools. Kinship was an important part of being a member 
in the firm, while being in the right social clubs greatly helped your chances to do 
business with one another. They organized the US Independence, governed states, ran 
central banks, and directed the moral compass through religious revival movements. 
They wanted to preserve and extend the rich tradition to the masses and were in positions 
of power to do so utilizing a cooperative approach. Being a benefactor of preeminent 
culture was normal in preserving the hierarchical structure as was providing relief for the 
downtrodden masses, which further extended their Anglo tradition’s influence. The 
House of Morgan’s involvement in education, from recruiting from the world’s finest 
universities such as Harvard to financially supporting free public education to sons of 
slaves in the South was very consistent with its overall belief in social standing and 
accompanying moral responsibility. Trust was the building block for all business 
11 
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opportunities as a merchant banker, which took generations to build and provided a steep 
entry level to budding merchant bankers. 
 
Trust in Business 
Famed political economist Francis Fukuyama has argued that nations can build 
organizations and social infrastructures that are trustworthy to allow for productive 
economic organizations to be built.20 In high-trust societies, trust is extended beyond the 
family with bigger organizations being able to develop—such as the large-cap US 
multinational—largely efficient organizations that are more reliable to deliver on a given 
outcome. Trust being dependent on confidence in prior actions is a predictive force for 
future behavior. The United States today, based on a continuous rule of law, and 
institutionalized through an extensive legal system, allows for a fairly predictable large-
scale capital investment environment to thrive. The trust in the United States has 
developed quite differently compared with that of the 19th-century British Empire. In 
London, confidence was underpinned largely by the person’s word, whereas the trust in 
the US today is fostered in the confidence that the extensive legal code will be respected 
and not continually altered. In the US, however, at the turn of the 20th century, business 
was built, functioned, and depended on trust in the character of the parties given limited 
formal protections to enforce contracts locally let alone globally. This in turn has allowed 
organizations in different economic spheres to build upon that broader societal trust. 
How did business get done locally, yet alone maintain a globally interconnected 
economy? At the turn of the 20th century, the British business model of gentlemen 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free 
Press, 1996), 2. 
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merchant banking ruled the day and allowed for a global economy to flourish. At the 
core, business was personal and the better you knew someone or respected his underling 
community standing a corresponding increase of confidence in a given transaction 
occurred. To limit risk, there were high barriers of entry for merchant bankers given lack 
of formal protections for domestic contracts and international transactions.21 With the 
economy built on trust among the partners of exclusive merchant banks, they facilitated 
the world-wide economy by investing their social, cultural, financial, and political capital 
built up over generations. Capital is commonly discussed in terms of materialistic forms 
such as money and labor. Still, social capital, for example, is immensely important to a 
functioning economy in aiding activity as it inheres in the structure of relations between 
the various parties within an economy.22 The societal capital built upon trust allowed 
merchant banks to serve their primary role, applying cooperation to obtain their 
objectives. Dealing with people with whom you are related, with whom you are in the 
same social clubs, or with whom you share religious beliefs will allow for shared norms 
and comparable world views. Nevertheless, even if two opposing groups are in very 
different social circles such as German-Jewish and Anglo-American bankers, cooperation 
is still the preferred option over competition in many cases. This is because both groups 
are underpinned by an analogous moral obligation that they are the stewards of a broader 
community and need to support the community interest even if it means cooperating with 
people not in the same social circle. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21Susie Pak, Gentlemen Bankers: The World of J.P. Morgan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2013), 14. 
22James Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American Journal of 
Sociology 94 (1988): S98. 
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The House of Morgan built up a substantial amount of cultural and social capital 
given preeminent standing of the partners within society, its illustrious business history, 
being benefactors of high culture and facilitating world-wide business transactions.23 
Merchant banks through their established name allowed budding large-cap US 
multinational’s ability to settle their transactions given the good faith that the private 
bankers forged over time and with it the predictability that the intended transaction would 
be honored. Merchant bankers assumed a moral responsibility with the investing public, 
and the banker’s character and reputation were a preeminent concern.24 The amount of 
credit to which the merchant bank had access was in essence, a barometer for its 
reputation. The community trust and high esteem bestowed to the House of Morgan 
comes from a record of success, strong financial resources but even more importantly the 
high character of the partners.25 The public at large entrusted bankers with great 
influence, however, if confidence for the underlying merchant bank is tainted, that 
community power would be quickly lost.26 
The House of Morgan abided by a code passed down from London merchant 
bankers honed over centuries and governed by rules not defined by a sovereign state, but 
a wider interlocked community where personal responsibilities for their clients and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23Ibid., S100. 
24Jules I. Bogen and Parker H. Willis, Investment Banking (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1929), 
31. 
25Pak, Gentlemen Bankers, 14. 
26J. Bradford DeLong, “J.P. Morgan and His Money Trust,” in Inside the Business Enterprise: 
Historical Perspectives on the Use of Information, ed. by Peter Temin (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991), 216. 
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partner reputation outside the business community were paramount.27 Business was not 
just measured in dollars and cents, but honor and responsibility as well directed future 
transactions. Central to this belief was that the House of Morgan’s partners’ financial 
capital was not the most important asset but was instead an impeccable reputation of the 
partners and their related high social standing, which was reflected in accumulated social 
capital. The House of Morgan was aware of the importance of trust in their investment 
dealings, which was shown in three consecutive generations of Morgans leadership. John 
Pierpont (J.P.) Morgan expressed that integrity was the central glue that held the world of 
private banking together and allowed for effective global operations.28 This belief was 
passed down from J.P. Morgan’s father who highlighted that being of high character 
made good long-term business sense.29 And J.P. Morgan passed down the same belief to 
his son Jack Morgan, who believed that strong character was more important than ample 
financial collateral for private bankers success.30 The reason why the leaders of the House 
of Morgan’s stress on eminent character and reputation as a trusted broker is incredibly 
sensitive. Having built-up years of esteemed dealings and sufficient market share can be 
lost in an unusually short time if the perception of the trustworthy organization is lost.31 
Social capital is not just based on a formidable business reputation, but the genesis comes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27Pak, Gentlemen Bankers, 20. 
28Carosso, The Morgans, 11. 
29Strouse, Morgan, 77. 
30Carosso, The Morgans, 2. 
31DeLong, “J.P. Morgan and His Money Trust,” 209. 
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from several factors. Family heritage is one of the most relevant, the longer your blood 
line goes back to people in distinguished social standing the higher your position. 
 
Family Heritage 
The fact that companies were arranged along family lines in most of the 19th 
century is not surprising when one considers the few formal structures in place for doing 
business.32 Merchant banks even more so were comprised of family members given the 
built-in basis for trust to build a foundation to draw capital and talent in future 
generations.33 This was clear not only with Anglo-American bankers, but even more so 
with German-Jewish. For Kuhn Loeb & Co., 100% of the partners were related to one 
another until 1912, the partners of Goldman Sachs & Co. were until 1915, and those of 
Lehman Brothers until 1924.34 Family connection was important for the House of 
Morgan as well with roughly 50% of partners having kinship ties from 1895 to 1900.35  
The Morgan partners’ families held leading places in society for many 
generations with distinguished American families who were well represented in the 
partnership ranks, including Astor, Hamilton, Morgan, Winthrop and Whitney to name a 
few. The typical Morgan partner family descended from wealthy origins in Great Britain 
during the early 17th or 18th century to America and predominately successful farmers, 
merchants or those who took up leading religious vocations. They grew up on the Eastern 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32Youssef Cassis, “Big Business” in The Oxford Handbook of Business History, ed. by Geoffrey 
Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 180. 
33Pak, Gentlemen Bankers, 48. 
34Ibid., 81. 
35Ibid., 49.!
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Seaboard, were high Episcopalian religiously, attended the most elite boarding schools in 
the Northeast, and pursued college degrees overwhelmingly in Ivy League schools. 
Culturally, they were cosmopolitan with staunchly anglophile sentiment. 
As I am about to detail within the thesis, the family history of the House of 
Morgan’s partners was both illustrious in their countries of origin but critical to the 
formation of the United States. In the British Empire, they possessed distinguished titles, 
were in the most mandarin of political circles, leading merchants, religious heads and 
central bankers. Their work in the Americas preceded, oversaw, and managed the 
creation of the United States. This can be shown from founding several colonies turned 
states to leading a war for Independence. They guided the moral compass for the US’s 
leading religious movements and founding of formidable religious organizations. 
Economically, they were the key architects behind the first and second US central banks 
to being the leading merchants of the era. Many of the US finest Ivy League schools’ 
histories tie directly with the preceding relatives from the House of Morgan. 
The House of Morgan’s families were the early pioneers to America, which was 
clearly evident from the leading family of the venerable merchant bank. The first Morgan 
to arrive in America was less than a generation removed from the initial European settlers 
at Plymouth and the family held leading positions within civic society on the maternal 
side and within business on the fraternal side.36 J.P. Morgan’s relatives on his maternal 
side included religious revival movement Great Awakening champion Jonathan 
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Edwards,37 James Pierpont who founded Yale University,38 Thomas Hooker, who today 
is also known as the “Father of Connecticut,”39 women’s rights activist Emma Willard, 
who founded the first school for women’s higher education40 and former US Vice 
President Aaron Burr.41 While J.P. Morgan’s fraternal side of the family had a strong 
track record in business as farmers in New England.42 The grandfather of J.P. Morgan, 
Joseph Morgan, built on the previous success, launching other winning companies 
including the Aetna Insurance Company43 and had an estate valued over $1 million 
dollars by the time of his passing in 1847.44 
Eugene Winthrop who was a partner in Morgan’s Paris operation for more than 
twenty years until his death in 1893 descended from one of the leading families.45 The 
Winthrop’s influential family includes John Winthrop (1588-1649), who founded the 
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Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630,46 John Winthrop, the Younger (1606-1676), who was 
one of the founders of the Connecticut Colony and a founding member of England’s 
Royal Society,47 and had many leading politicians through the following generations who 
bore the Winthrop name. Robert Bacon’s family, a leading New York partner, was 
among the beginning settlers of Massachusetts;48 in fact, his family history stretches back 
to leading followers of William the Conqueror in 1066 and included generations of 
noblemen holding prominent positions, including chief commanders in war in London 
and equivalent to Lord Chancellor’s role.49 Robert Bacon’s wife Martha was a leader in 
the nonprofit sector, especially shining during World War I, given her leading work with 
ambulance corps and hospitals, having been awarded the French Legion of Honor.50 
George S. Bowdoin’s family came to Boston in 1690. The Bowdoin family was 
among the wealthiest in Massachusetts, including a governor, president of Massachusetts 
Constitutional Convention, first president of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, benefactor of the Bowdoin College and international delegates with France and 
Spain. George Bowdoin’s wife, Julia, was the daughter of Moses H. Grinnell, 
Congressman, Collector of the Port of New York and a Commissioner of New York 
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City’s Central Park.51 George W. Perkins’ family was among the first settlers of 
Massachusetts in 1631 and his father was a pioneer in the life insurance industry.52 The 
original head of the House of Morgan, George Peabody, common ancestor from 
Hertfordshire, England, came to the United States in 1635, while from the poorer side of 
the family was still a part of a long-established family line.53 Thomas W. Lamont’s 
family arrived in America in 1750, fought in the Revolutionary War, and had been 
leading local religious leaders such as his father Reverend Thomas Lamont.54 New York 
partner William Pierson Hamilton was the grandson of Alexander Hamilton and married 
Juliet Pierpont Morgan, J.P. Morgan’s daughter.55 Henry P. Davison’s wife, Mrs. Kate 
Trubee, was a leading supporter of the Red Cross, a patroness of music education, and 
started an education scholarship program.56 
London partners also equaled historic families and preeminent married ties. 
Edward Charles Grenfell had solid family banking, political, merchant, and aristocratic 
connections.57 This included leading developers in Latin American railroads, British 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51“George S. Bowdoin Dead at 80 Years,” New York Tribune, Dec 17,1913,!
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/575190166?accountid=11311. 
52“Career: of Perkins Closed. Financier Succumbs to Nervous Breakdown,” Cincinnati Enquirer, 
Jun 19,1920, http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/866669838?accountid=11311. 
53Kathleen Burk, Morgan Grenfell 1838-1988: The Biography of a Merchant Bank (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 1. 
54Edward Lamont, The Ambassador from Wall Street: The Story of Thomas W. Lamont J.P 
Morgan’s Chief Executive (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1994), 5. 
55“W. Pierson Hamilton Retires,” Wall Street Journal, Jan 2, 1922, http://search.proquest.com.ezp-
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/130075631?accountid=11311. 
56“Mrs. Henry P. Davison Dies,” New York Herald Tribune, Feb 1, 1962, 
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/1325835604?accountid=11311. 
57Marquise De. Fontenoy, “House of Grenfell Long Prominent,” Washington Post, Aug 23, 1913. 
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/145250880?accountid=11311. 
20 
!
!
 
bankers, directors of the Bank of England, parliament members, governor of the Royal 
Exchange Assurance company, President of Thames Conservancy Board for over thirty 
years, and family who are connected via marriage with London’s most prestigious blood 
lines, including Marlborough, Portland, and St. Albans.58 Vivian Hugh Smith had leading 
political relatives in parliament and the Bank of England and also a strong business line. 
The son of Hugh Colin Smith owner of Hay’s Wharf, the largest wharfage enterprise in 
London and grandfather who was John Able Smith was founding partner of Jardine, 
Matteson and Co., the largest of the foreign trading companies in China.59 Charles 
Frederick Whigham, older brother of Sir Robert Whigham, was a general in the British 
Army.60 Another brother, George Whignam, was a chairman of the board of the Celanese 
Corporation and another sibling, Walter Kennedy Whigham, was director of the Bank of 
England.61 
The Philadelphia arm of the House of Morgan was dominated by the Drexel 
family before its merger, one of the most preeminent family lines in the US. They were 
related to the Astors, Biddles, Dukes, Ingersolls, Mellons, Roosevelts, Vanderbilts, 
Whartons, Whitneys, Wyeths, and British nobility to name a few.62 Arthur Newbold’s 
wife, Harriet Dixon, was the granddaughter of George Mifflin Dallas, erstwhile U.S. vice 
president under President James Polk, US Senator, private secretary Albert Gallatin, 
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counsel to Second Bank of the United States and former US ambassador to Great Britain 
under Franklin Pierce.63 Her great grandfather Alexander James Dallas was Secretary of 
Treasury and War under James Madison.64 James W. Paul Jr.’s sister was Mrs. William 
Waldorf Astor and also a member of the Biddle family.65 Edward T. Stotesbury’s wife, 
Mrs. Eva Roberts, received the Medal of Honor from France during World War I. She 
along with her husband were social leaders in Palm Beach, holding exclusive parties 
regularly.66 In general, no matter where the location, the firm had been the leading 
supporters financially for the Episcopalian Church, which tended to be the faith of the 
wealthy and powerful. The House of Morgan would serve their clients and business 
interests with a high degree of moral responsibility, which can be partly traced to the role 
of religion in their lives. 
 
Religion 
The House of Morgan saw itself as the moral conscience for business. It is not 
surprising that sons of preachers would be attracted to the firm.67 Morgan’s partners were 
leading members of the Episcopalian Church nationally—US-based member of the 
Anglican community—which dominated its partnership ranks with thirteen out of 
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eighteen American partners from 1895 to 1913 being Episcopalian.68 Morgan’s 
ancestors’ role in many of the US leading religious movements is quite remarkable. 
Morgan’s great-grandfather Jonathan Edwards was the leader of the First Great 
Awakening in US evangelical religious revival back in the mid-18th century.69 Reverend 
Pierpont also on his maternal side led radical causes for the time ranging from the 
abolition of slavery to the education of girls.70 Anthony J. Drexel, whose family in 
Philadelphia was leading pillars of the Church of the Savior, an Episcopalian Church, 
was the uncle of Katharine Drexel, who became a Saint in the Roman Catholic faith 
given her work in promoting quality education and social equality for minorities.71 
Thomas Lamont’s father was a prominent Methodist minister, while George C. Thomas’ 
nephew was rector of the largest Sunday school in Philadelphia, Church of the 
Apostles.72 
As one of America’s most influential Episcopal laymen, J.P. Morgan in his own 
way as would many of his partners would continue to have a moral responsibility and 
sense of duty from religious tradition applied to the business world.73 J.P. Morgan would 
be the largest benefactor to the venerable Episcopalian Church in New York, bringing on 
Reverend William Rainsford’s intent to focus on social justice such as fighting poverty in 
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city slums, promoting public health issues, and supporting workers’ rights.74 Morgan’s 
lead was followed by many other partners. George S. Bowdoin was a leading donor of St. 
John the Divine;75 Arthur Newbold was on the Commission of Episcopal Church, Charles 
Steele was a senior warden and supporter of St Thomas Church and Protestant Episcopal 
Church,76 and George W. Perkins was a chief supporter of the Young Men’s Christian 
Association.77 Anthony J. Drexel was a leading benefactor of Episcopal bishop Henry C. 
Potter, the founder of the eventual US’s largest Church, St John the Divine.78  
While kinship and religion were an important part of being a member in the firm, 
being in the right social clubs greatly helped your chances of getting recruited by the 
House of Morgan. Social norms, etiquette, ethics, and world view are remarkably 
impacted by one’s upbringing and coming from a shared background fostered closer 
relations. All the partners but one in New York lived within only a four-block radius of 
each other and raised their families together, enhancing the tight bonds.79 Social ties in 
exclusive clubs is a decisive factor of one’s standing given the difficulty of getting into 
these clubs and the personal time spent with other folks of illustrious standing. Business 
was very personal in merchant banking and the elite social clubs promoted tighter bonds. 
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Social Clubs 
Social clubs were a mainstay in England and an integral part of merchant 
banking—shown by preeminent bankers’ involvement, including Sir Ernest Cassel, Lord 
Rothschild or Lord Revelstoke.80 The leading businessmen in the US also belonged to the 
elite social clubs. George F. Baker, James Stillman, and William K. Vanderbilt had more 
than eight social clubs in common with J.P. Morgan.81 Similar to leading London 
bankers, all the partners in the House of Morgan had generally significant representation 
in most prestigious social clubs, which further ascribed high social status to its 
members.82 Ties between the leading partners of the most mandarin merchant banks went 
back several generations in the small world of banking.83 After kinship, having strong 
social circles to recruit new partners or conduct business in far-off lands was pivotal for 
the time. Having shared values within social norms, religion with similar friends was 
prime grounds for recruitment within a merchant banking firm.84 
Being a leading partner at the House of Morgan and the number of social ties 
were very much correlated, and high social capital was valued to the firms overall 
identity.85 Club membership was an important part of the merchant bank’s operations as 
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it helped to cultivate clients and to keep strong ties within its broader community.86 
Social clubs were also of vital importance as it signified that a member was a part of a 
select community with high social standing. It was a good gauge so without even 
knowing a person you could be fairly certain they had similar values and world views.87 
Morgan partners belonged to these most privileged clubs, including J.P. Morgan’s 
membership to nineteen private clubs, which included co-founding the Metropolitan 
Club.88 Even the Morgan partner wives and daughters were a part of posh social clubs. 
The Colony Club for women had all of Morgan’s female relatives. Daughter Anne was 
one of the founders and a treasurer.89 
The importance of the social clubs from a business standpoint can be seen in its 
preeminent role in business history for the time. The most influential private partnership 
creation, the largest public corporation organization, the handling of a financial panic, 
and the construction of the US central reserve were all partly conceived at a social club. 
House of Morgan announced its formal partnership in a social club when Morgan had all 
of his American partners for dinner at the Metropolitan Club and reorganized under a 
new partnership agreement at the start of 1895.90 The conception of US Steel also 
happened at a social club when Carnegie Steel’s president Charles Schwab gave a 
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compelling speech to many senior bankers, including J.P. Morgan in December 1900.91 
Full-blown financial panic in 1907 was averted due to the work conducted in social clubs. 
J.P. Morgan and other key partners would meet regularly every night at the Union League 
Club to come up with a solution.92 J.P. Morgan and other leaders in New York started a 
social club off the coast of Georgia, the Jekyl Island Club. In November 1910, five of the 
leading private bankers, Senator Nelson Aldrich and a US Treasury official met to 
discuss plans for central banking and laid the framework of what would become the 
Federal Reserve System.93 
The House of Morgan, supporting and developing leading social clubs in the 
leading commercial city in the US extended naturally to culture as seen in ancient 
Athens, Renaissance Florence and London of the 19th century. It was not just some of the 
era’s most important deals that happened at social clubs, given that financial syndicate 
members were still a part of the same clubs. Regular deals were in addition to being 
discussed with key external partners, with roughly 80% on average of syndicate partners 
belonging to the prestigious Social Register from 1900 to 1925.94 While social clubs were 
an instrumental part of building up social capital and conducting business, Morgan took 
the strategy to the sea by being one of the leading yachtsmen worldwide. In 1882, J.P. 
Morgan joined the New York Yacht Club and purchased the first of several gigantic 
yachts, which served as a meeting place for business transactions and for settling 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91Carosso, The Morgans, 468. 
92Pak, Gentlemen Bankers, 72. 
93Strouse, Morgan, 362. 
94Pak, Gentlemen Bankers, 76. 
27 
!
!
 
disputes.95 This included settling a major railroad dispute of the Pennsylvania Railroad 
and New York Central known as the “Corsair Compact” in 1885.96 Whether, it was on 
land or by sea, the elite social circles were predominantly filled with individuals from the 
finest Ivy League colleges. Supporting and attending the Ivy League schools was very 
much a part of the House of Morgan’s tradition in building up its social status. 
 
Education 
When it comes to being benefactors to education, the Morgan family and partners 
have a long legacy few could match. On J.P. Morgan’s maternal side of the family, at the 
start of the 18th century, minister James Pierpont after attending Harvard College 
founded Yale College.97 Also on the maternal side, the Reverend Aaron Burr Sr. soon 
after founded the College of New Jersey (Princeton University), while his forefathers 
were among the earliest of pioneers in promoting public education in the American 
colonies.98 Also on J.P. Morgan’s maternal side, women’s rights activist Emma Willard 
founded the first US school for women’s higher education, the Troy Female Seminary. 
Other universities of higher learning were founded by Morgan’s partners families. Tony 
Drexel founded Drexel University and a medical school.99 The George S. Bowdoin 
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family originally endowed Bowdoin College in Maine.100 Columbia University, the 
University of Pennsylvania, and Yale were also well endowed by the House of Morgan 
financially.101 Arthur Newbold’s was a trustee of the University of Pennsylvania.102 
Of all the Ivy League schools, Harvard received the strongest support from the 
House of Morgan, which had a social hierarchy similar to the one on display in Gilded 
Age New York.103 House of Morgan’s partners Robert Bacon, Thomas Lamont, and Jack 
Morgan had served as members of Harvard University Board of Overseers.104 George 
Peabody would continue the generosity towards higher education by endowing an 
archaeology museum at Harvard and also a natural history museum at Yale University.105 
Thomas Lamont, likewise, financed the main undergraduate library at Harvard.106 Lamont 
also played the leading role in convincing Morgan’s closest ally George Baker of First 
National to fund the Harvard Business School campus.107 
While many of the elder Morgan partners did not attend any college, Harvard 
University would have an especially increasing role in the firm’s makeup and prestige 
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with leading Morgan partners from 1895 to 1913 attending, including Robert Bacon, 
Edward Whitney, William P. Hamilton, George S. Bowdoin, Jack Morgan, George 
Perkins, Arthur Newbold, James Paul Jr., and Thomas Lamont.108 This was similarly seen 
at other elite Anglo-American merchant banks, including Lee, Higginson & Co., having 
78% of its partners attend Harvard by 1910.109 Henry P. Davison and William P. 
Hamilton went to Yale, while Charles Steele, Dwight Morrow, and Temple Bowdoin 
went to Columbia.110 Leading Morgan partners such as Sir Clinton Dawkins attending 
Oxford and “Teddy” Grenfell going to Cambridge would at separate times run the 
London office. Attendees of the finest Ivy League did not just attain a strong education 
but were also instilled with a sense of service to their community consummate with their 
social standing. This was common throughout the firm’s partners and consistent with its 
immense social standing to be a benefactor to society and to extending their plush 
tradition forward. 
 
Benefactors of High Culture 
The affluent tradition made famous by the House of Medici family during the 
Renaissance in the 15th century, was continued on by financiers at the turn of the 20th 
century, including the House of Morgan as the leading supporters of grand culture in the 
US. The partners, as in business matters, took their cues from J.P. Morgan, who was a 
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legendary art collector boasting the biggest private art collection of the day globally.111 
J.P. Morgan was an original patron of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1870, trustee 
(1888-1904), president (1904-1913) and not only consistently its largest donor, but was 
the driving force for the Museum’s meteoric rise—by early the 20th century it became 
the largest art museum in the United States.112 Additional Morgan partners supporting the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art included Thomas Lamont as a trustee, Robert Gordon as 
one of the original 28 trustees,113 and Jack Morgan who carried on the rich tradition by 
donating much of his father’s extensive collection to the Museum. Philadelphia partners, 
such as Edward T. Stotesbury as President of Philadelphia’s Art Jury,114 and George C. 
Thomas as a noted art collector115 were also leading supporters of the arts. 
Natural sciences were another area of keen interest for the House of Morgan’s 
partners’ benevolence. From its inception in 1869, J.P. Morgan was a board member and 
typically the greatest donor to the largest public facing organization, the American 
Museum of Natural History, until his death in 1913, while Henry P. Davison was a 
treasure of the National Institute of Social Sciences.116 Edward T. Stotesbury was a 
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director of the Philadelphia Grand Opera Company,117 while J.P. Morgan was an original 
patron of the Metropolitan Opera and continually maintained a box within Metropolitan 
Opera’s Golden Horseshoe.118 Eminent sports clubs were increasingly popular with 
younger partners, including Temple Bowdoin, Charles Steele, Henry P. Davison, and 
Thomas Lamont, who were all members of golf clubs. Tennis club members from the 
Morgan partnership included Temple Bowdoin, Henry P. Davison, and Horatio G. Lloyd. 
The House of Morgan’s partners were not just having good times at posh clubs and 
serving the upper class interest by endowing the arts but were also deeply involved in 
supporting charities for the poor and were the vanguard in modern-day philanthropy 
development. 
 
Philanthropy 
George Peabody set the standard for future partners through his extensive 
charitable work, including supporting Lord Shaftesbury’s Ragged Schools for 
underprivileged children and helping to build model homes for the working class in 
London.119 Peabody was honored by the eventual King Edward VII in 1862 as a Freeman 
of the City of London, the first American to receive the honor and with a statue, of 
himself behind the Royal Exchange for his trust fund for housing for poor of London.120 
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Being benefactors to the poor’s education system and extending the rich tradition 
the partners had received were very much a part of their overall social standing. In fact, 
the rise of corporate philanthropy in the United States began with the House of Morgan 
and the Peabody Education Fund. The Peabody Education Fund was the first such 
foundation whose scope was recognized as national rather than local, to select trustees 
from professional and financial circles, and to leverage their grants through community 
involvement.121 Its founding by George Peabody with a staggering $2 million in 1869 
was an attempt to help heal relations with the war-torn South by directing the funds to 
Southern primary schools and also promoting a standardize curriculum.122 The 
organization leadership would include several US presidents such as Ulysses S. Grant 
and General Robert E. Lee who had given their full support.123 Key Morgan partners as 
leaders, including J.P. Morgan and Tony Drexel would serve on the board. The 
organization would be pivotal in helping to merge small schools into larger multi-
classroom organizations and promote a standardized curriculum. Similar to how 
corporations under the Morgan gambit would cooperate; the same would be seen with the 
largest foundations, as shown in education with actual amendments passed to coordinate 
with Rockefeller’s General Education Board in 1903 by the Peabody Education Fund.124 
The following years up till the Great War, it was difficult to tell apart the programs and 
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work of the major education charities such as Peabody Education Fund, the General-
Education Board, and the John F. Slater Fund given the very close cooperation among the 
organizations.125 
One organization, in particular, that had many Morgan partners deeply involved 
in the US was one of the world’s largest charities, the Red Cross, including George W. 
Perkins,!Horatio G. Lloyd, Dwight Morrow, and Henry Herman Harjes as board 
members. However, no Morgan partner was as involved with the Red Cross than Henry 
P. Davison, who headed all Red Cross activities in World War I.126 While the Red Cross 
was founded much earlier, it was chartered by an Act of Congress in 1905; its president 
would be the same as the president of the United States and would be a quasi-public-
private organization with unmatched power and impact in the non-profit space. Being a 
transnational organization was an ideal solution to extending the rich tradition down to 
the downtrodden in a charitable setting. Henry P. Davison would help turn the Red Cross 
into the most powerful charity in the US. Raising over $113 million during his First 
Liberty Loan Drive’s first week alone in 1917, its membership swelled to over 5 million 
members.127 Eventually, he helped raise over $400 million by 1919, which was used in 
areas such as improvement of health and disease prevention in war-torn Europe. In total 
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by 1919, a staggering 31 million total members was a part of the Red Cross volunteer 
force.128  
As discussed in previous sections, the House of Morgan through its family’s 
illustrious history and partners, preeminent standing had leading social and cultural 
capital in the US. Being a benefactor to high culture and taking care of those in need are 
both critical factors as they convey a sense of moral responsibility and obligation for the 
community. In order to understand why the House of Morgan helped develop the US 
large cap multinational corporation around the turn of the 20th century one must also 
understand how it viewed its role in relation to the world’s most powerful empire and 
moral obligations it took on given its positions within society. 
 
Moral Obligation to Society 
At the turn of the 20th century Great Britain was the largest empire the world had 
ever seen, spanning 12 million square miles and incorporating roughly a quarter of the 
world’s population.129 Its unmatched navy—39% of world’s ocean-going vessels—
provided for safe passage and an interconnected global market.130 The British Empire 
steered trade, primarily importing raw materials/food and exporting higher margin 
manufactured goods comprising nearly a third of the world’s total.131 London was the 
world’s chief business center boasting the largest financial infrastructure, including 
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London’s money market, largest commercial market for setting commodity prices, and by 
1910, of all total tradable securities, 25% were owned by Great Britain’s citizens.132 
While few could argue the enormous size and scope of the British Empire, there were 
some who expressed concern about its benefits. “Little Englanders,” best typified by 
William Gladstone and Sir William Harcourt, was not only opposed to further colonial 
expansion but saw the Empire as a burden causing potentially needless wars. Empire 
seemed illogical to them given the fact that nations like America could more than absorb 
British products and the fruitless endeavors that in the long run would not be able to hold 
the empire together with colonies eventually pulling away.133 
Ultimately, the British Empire’s policy around the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries was driven by a “New Imperialism.” The arguments were best personified by a 
professor at Oxford who would be the first holder of the Slade professorship for Fine Art 
in 1869, John Ruskin.134 Professor Ruskin’s audience were members of a privileged 
ruling class at Oxford whom he fervently believed had the most magnificent tradition and!
culture the world had ever seen in areas of education, law, beauty, and personal freedom, 
underpinned by a Christian calling for social justice about which he lectured 
passionately.135 This wonderful tradition would cease to exist, and deservedly so, unless 
it could be extended to the downtrodden masses and also move away from its 
increasingly hedonistic tendencies that ultimately brought down other powers like Venice 
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during the Renaissance.136 Industrialization, free trade, and globalization were powerful 
trends building increasingly urban cities that were interconnected globally through trade 
and strong migration, which brought not only greater economic opportunity but took 
previously diverse cultures and beliefs together that were increasingly becoming unified. 
The question would be which culture and tradition would be the underpinnings of the 
modern globalized world in the generations to come. If the British tradition were not 
spread to the majority of people around the world, the fine English tradition of the upper 
class could be totally submerged and ultimately lost. The old way of the British Empire 
being fostered for primarily material advantage was now discredited for the increasingly 
globally interconnected times. A new call to action, charged by a moral duty guided 
through social service, was to be the rallying cry for not only the continuation of the 
Empire but also for an aggressive expansion of the underlying culture and traditions 
globally to the masses in other nations.137 
It was men like Alfred Lord Milner, Arnold Toynbee, Alfred Beit, Cecil Rhodes, 
and Lord Rothschild, to name a few, who heard the moral command for action and took!
up the cause with a great fervor.138 Cecil Rhodes, a former Oxford student who was 
deeply impacted by Ruskin lectures, provides a splendid illustration of what he believed 
as a righteous crusade in action, ranging from trying to federate Africa under British 
Empire control to promoting the culture of the rich traditions Ruskin discussed abroad by 
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creating the Rhodes Scholarships at Oxford.139 Alfred Lord Milner would play an 
enormous role in shaping foreign policy for the British Empire through his recruitment 
from Oxford with “Milner Kindergarten” and the formation of the round table movement 
starting in Chatham House that would increasingly promote British traditions on a global 
basis.140 
It is important to note that the Morgan partners were cosmopolitan in upbringing, 
had an internationalist mindset, were British culture conscious, and were staunch 
anglophiles. The three heads of the House of Morgan until World War I—George 
Peabody, Junius Morgan, and J.P. Morgan—lived in London for a significant amount of 
time, especially during their careers as merchant bankers. George Peabody lived 
exclusively in London once his career as a merchant banker began to his death, serving as 
both America’s foremost businessman and philanthropist in England.141 Junius as well 
spent the majority of his merchant banking career based in London.142 J.P. Morgan was 
even more cosmopolitan; spending time each year in London and felt equally at home in 
New York City, Boston, London, Paris, Cairo, and Rome.143 His son Jack Morgan spent 
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the formative years of his career in London and would remain an anglophile until his 
death.144 
As I elaborated, the House of Morgan was not just a group of dominant merchant 
bankers who used their financial capital to develop the US large-cap multinational 
corporation, but were also leading benefactors of high culture, political decision makers, 
protectors of the downtrodden and led by those possessing the highest degree of social 
status. The partners operated on a high-principled duty to society as a whole, while 
making vital profitable decisions, as also was cooperation among the various elements of 
the broader community in promoting a stabilized society. The House of Morgan operated 
on a truly global scale. Their actions were guided by what they believed would best serve 
the international community long-term for the preservation of the fine British tradition, 
order, morals—contrary to just one company, a sector, or a nation of interests for that 
matter. 
One of the biggest concerns the House of Morgan had in regard to the economy in 
the 1880s and 1890s was that the specter of overproduction could not only reduce profits 
within a respective sector, but also was more broadly a serious threat to undermine the 
financial system and creating greater instability for society in general.145 On paper, 
expanded production looked good for an individual company giving more sales, rising 
profits, gains in market share, and potentially higher stock returns. However, for the 
Morgan partners with such a long-term view encompassing a broader society worth of 
interests, overproduction had many other negative side effects. Long-term profit 
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prospects were more uncertain about an industry level, as profit margins would be 
squeezed when price wars would begin, but also that other industries that were 
interconnected would be greatly impacted by these price wars and new instability 
fostered. An example would be the rails in the late 19th century. While no question over 
building of rail lines and too much debt were major issues, consistently lowering rail 
rates to serve other industries during price wars created great instability in an industry 
that needed stability, given all its fixed long-term costs and heavy reliance on outside 
capital. This was seen first with Rockefeller’s interests having a stranglehold on the rail 
industry and later with the US Steel merger partially protecting the rails from an 
impending price war. If longer-term profits could not be reasonably guaranteed, the 
massive financial capital requirements needed to maintain and grow industry would be in 
doubt. 
Competition had been a hallmark of success for many of the budding capitalists 
such as Vanderbilt, Rockefeller, and Carnegie when they built their respective industrial 
empires. However, the overly competitive environment pushed the rest of the industry 
into increased production to maintain its position and competition was now not desirable 
for these same business titans given their respective leading market share. Also 
importantly, similar to key leaders within the British Empire, the members of the House 
of Morgan believed they had a unique obligation and moral calling, applying their 
enormous energies towards dealing with overproduction and rapid competition that 
threatened to undermine the global framework.146 The House of Morgan would help to 
organize the broader US society by interlocking different subsystems, including finance, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146Ibid., 321. 
40 
!
!
 
charity, and politics with business segment under the leadership of the large multinational 
corporation in promotion of a more harmonious society, predictable financial landscape, 
and productive economy.!
Morgan’s partners had a clear goal of helping to create a large, global operation 
that would belong in an oligopoly industry structure with high barriers to compete, 
ultimately manifesting in the contemporary multinational.147 Competition that had no 
central planning was ruinous in their eyes, wasting capital and promoting potential 
financial panics. It prevented the development of sustainable long-term planning for a 
stable economy. The large-cap multinational corporation in the US was formed largely 
through cooperation not competition among business interests and other key stakeholders 
in society around the turn of the 20th century. As I shall further discuss in upcoming 
chapters, as middlemen from the various parts of the economy, the House of Morgan was 
entrusted with not just influence of an advisor but one with leading control to develop the 
new corporate structure and underlying environmental structure. Besides the organization 
of the multinational corporation as a means to stabilize the economy and society, Morgan 
partners promoted their tradition through national and transnational organizations. This 
included creating the Federal Reserve for monetary stability, leading the Red Cross as the 
largest US nonprofit, and the promotion of a more standardized educational curriculum 
through its leadership of the Peabody Education Funds. Its leading impact upon other 
areas of society was greatly aided by the fact it was the leading US merchant bank of the 
era and controlled an enormous amount of financial capital. 
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Chapter III 
House of Morgan Financial Capital 
 
The House of Morgan securely entrenched itself as the preeminent merchant bank 
for the US markets during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Being a dominant dealer of 
US Government securities to the largest corporate sector provider with the railroads, the 
House of Morgan boasted an unparalleled rolodex of clients, building up substantial 
financial capital in the process. Its access to global economic centers was unparalleled, 
leveraging commercial banks, insurance, trusts and merchant banks through board 
representation and being top shareholders. The House of Morgan would apply a 
cooperative approach both internally in dealing with supposed competing merchant banks 
and externally when servicing clients. Consistently over multiple decades the Morgan 
partners could organize and oversee the largest financial syndicates the world had ever 
seen in supporting their corporate clients. Its high return for investors and clients alike 
over the decades spoke volumes on why the House of Morgan was the preferred 
merchant bankers of choice. 
 
Morgan Business History 
The House of Morgan derived its name from the fact that the leading partner in 
terms of capital for seven decades was a Morgan. However, the founder was a successful 
merchant from Baltimore turned banker George Peabody. In 1837, after years of 
transatlantic voyage, Mr. Peabody moved to London permanently to run his now 
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merchant bank, George Peabody & Co., which started in 1838.148 While the preeminent 
private banks in London set up agents in the US, such as Thomas Ward for Barings 
Brothers & Co. or August Belmont for the Rothschild’s, George Peabody & Co. became 
a leading wholesaler of investment securities for the United States but based instead in 
London. While the United States offered ample investment rewards in the mid-19th 
century, risks were still high even in the quality asset classes such as state securities. This 
was illustrated following the Panic of 1837 when several states defaulted on their interest 
payments.149 One of the trademarks of merchant bankers is vouching for securities from 
those who are seeking capital and representing investment community interests. George 
Peabody & Co. demonstrated its commitment to its clients following the Panic of 1837, 
leveraging its powerful Washington connections. George Peabody partnered with the 
Barings in creating a political fund to spread positive news stories for debt resumption 
and also to elect legislators who favored honoring interest payments. The strategy in both 
Maryland and Pennsylvania was successful.150 Actions like this not only increased 
investor trust in George Peabody & Co., it was more often than not quite profitable.151 
George Peabody & Co. was involved early on in corporate trade and in promoting 
American business interest overseas by regularly hosting US citizens in London for 
dinners and evenings out enjoying the arts.152 George Peabody & Co.’s support to US 
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business interests was amply illustrated in 1851 when the U.S. government failed to 
finance participation in Great Britain’s Prince Albert’s major international exhibition of 
industrial products held at the Crystal Palace and Peabody & Co. picked up the $15,000 
bill. Between May and October 1851 six million people saw the various exhibitions 
where Cyrus McCormick’s reaper won a Gold Medal at the World’s Fair and Samuel 
Colt’s revolvers garnered enough support to set up new operations in London.153 
By the 1850’s George Peabody & Co. was only a notch below the most mandarin 
of London merchant bankers of Barings Brothers and Rothschild, benefiting from a 
strong European appetite once again for American securities—Europeans held about 20% 
of outstanding US securities, London comprising the lion share.154 Normally increased 
activity for merchant banks would rely on kin to deal with additional work and adding a 
partner. However, Peabody had no legitimate children to be heirs and thus would look 
externally. The ideal candidate was found in another American with strong European ties, 
Junius Spencer Morgan, given in part his strong business acumen, demonstrated by 
tripling sales in a previous dry goods business.155 Importantly, Junius Spencer Morgan 
possessed a long stoic family history and an impeccable name within the most aristocratic 
of circles.156 
From 1854 to 1864 George Peabody & Co. was organized as a private 
unincorporated partnership with Junius as a partner. The firm did not have to submit to 
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federal or state authorities and was beneficial when dealing with international 
governments as ideal channels for diplomacy, given its naturally discreet manner.157 
However, unlike a corporation, they had unlimited liability in their business structure, 
which nearly cost them everything during the Panic of 1857 and were saved by an 
emergency credit line from Bank of England.158 George Peabody & Co. would quickly 
recover and make a leading name in American government and corporate securities, 
particularly the rapidly expanding rails. 
By 1864, George Peabody was ready to focus full-time on his considerable 
philanthropic ventures and George Peabody & Co. would cease to exist, with J.S. Morgan 
& Co. its replacement, building upon its previous success focusing on American railroads 
and manufacturing requiring overseas credit facilities.159 Government transactions would 
remain at the core of the business, and the firm increased its prestige immensely in 1870 
with a massive loan to France.160 Having a world power as a client was beneficial in 
several respects, including the increased status of the bank’s prestige with other high end 
relationships that could be long lasting.161 J.S. Morgan & Co., the most important 
government account during the 1870s, would be leading the massive $1.4 billion 
refunding of US Treasury Civil War debt, which was the largest financial undertaking 
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globally during the decade.162 J.S. Morgan & Co. gained an aire of mystery and prestige 
given its leading role in serving leading governments, leveraged in serving corporate 
accounts as well.163 Backed by trust in J.S. Morgan & Co. operations, investors were also 
attracted by the higher return proposition in US corporate bonds which in the late 19th 
century were roughly earning 10 percent on railroad bonds on average, compared with 5 
percent for London’s comparable securities.164 
Dating back to George Peabody’s reign, Morgan’s would retain a preeminent 
position in promoting the leading corporate sector—US railroad securities—until the 
early 20th century.165 The rails required significant amounts of capital, which would 
facilitate the widespread use of a corporation’s status and increase dependency on 
powerful merchant bankers, and in particular, J.S. Morgan & Co.166 J.S. Morgan & Co. 
would outshine its rail clients in terms of name recognition and trustfulness with 
investors going forward as ownership became increasingly public.167 The firm handled 
the top railroad deal of its time in 1879, New York Central, which was important in the 
trend of companies going from a private family to public ownership, and was the largest 
block of stock to ever be offered to the public.168 
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The most prolific railroad investment banker of the late 19th and into the 20th 
century would be Junius’s son, J.P. Morgan. From his cosmopolitan upbringing, being 
schooled in Geneva, Germany, and the United States, to having worked with leading 
merchant banks at an early age in New York, J.P. Morgan was nurtured to be a merchant 
banker. However, in the 1870s J.P. Morgan was still early in his career and in July 1871 
the young J.P. Morgan would set up a partnership with the leading American banker of 
the time, Anthony J. Drexel.169 Drexel, Morgan & Co. would bring the leading 
Philadelphia financial firm headed by Anthony J. Drexel with J.P. Morgan who would be 
the leading partner in New York, plus Drexel’s partners who had established Drexel, 
Harjes & Co. in Paris that would be the French affiliate. The Drexel family had made a 
name for itself earlier by funding the US in the Mexican War in 1847, 170 serving as the 
largest depository during the California gold rush in the early 1850s,171 financing leading 
railroads including Philadelphia’s first railroad,172 and partnering with Jay Cooke in 
funding the Union army during the American Civil War.173 Anthony J. Drexel and J.P. 
Morgan would be the dominant bankers in the US partnership and the country at large for 
the coming decades. By the time of Junius’s passing in 1890 and Anthony J. Drexel’s 
death in 1893, J.P. Morgan would become the unquestioned head of the partnership and 
American finance at large. 
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Organization of House of Morgan 
The structure of the new J.P. Morgan lead organization would resemble the 
leading global financial houses comprised of not just one firm but several unincorporated 
private firms in the major financial centers of Europe and the U.S. that were interlocked 
through capital. In total, there were four firms and in the aggregate represented the House 
of Morgan. The center of the Morgan House was without question London prior to the 
1890s with New York dominating thereafter. J.S. Morgan & Co. stayed on as the London 
arm until reorganized as Morgan Grenfell & Co. in 1910. 
The Philadelphia firm was known as Drexel & Co. given the leading history of 
the Drexel family, while the Paris branch was called Morgan, Harjes & Co. and the firm’s 
overall capital would be J.P. Morgan & Co. in New York on 23 Wall Street. The New 
York office fittingly was at the crossroads between corporate, government and Wall 
Street headquarters, facing both the New York Stock Exchange and Sub Treasury 
building. The House of Morgan continued to be organized as a private unlimited liability 
partnership with J.P. Morgan the unquestioned head—his ownership averaged 38 percent 
between 1895 and 1913.174 He would head both New York and Philadelphia, while being 
senior partner in Paris and co-presiding over the London house. The firm was informally 
run with none of the many formalities that would be implemented in the Morgan 
developed corporations—with the panic of 1907 being the first time formal meetings 
were held.175 Given how large its role in the economy, the overall number of workers was 
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quite small in New York, with roughly the other three locations equal in the aggregate for 
a total of 300 workers throughout the House of Morgan.176 In each of the sectors on 
which the House of Morgan focused, they had the leading experts employed, as 
illustrated by the rails, such as Samuel Spencer, known to be on top of every detail of 
railroads and Charles Coster who sat on the boards of fifty-nine corporations he helped 
organize.177 
In terms of pursuing clients, it was considered bad form to compete with other 
merchant banks through price or formal advertising; instead, the most exclusive clients 
sought to work with the House of Morgan as if obtaining membership to a private club. 
Serving the leading global powers, Popes and Royalty in Europe, to the most venerable 
families worldwide such as the Astors and Vanderbilts would give the House of Morgan 
an unmatched rolodex.178 The House of Morgan could be mistakenly identified often as 
another arm of the US government given its central role in dollar diplomacy and a quasi-
central bank lender of last resort. It would continue to cater to the most exclusive US 
corporations such as General Electric, International Harvester, and US Steel.179 
Typically, high sustainable profits attract competitors into the market. However, 
in the world of private banking reputation proved a barrier that took many years to ascend 
in order to obtain meaningful market share. The House of Morgan’s competitive edge 
was its reputation based on its outstanding business track record, but even more 
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importantly, the impeccable character its partners had forged. Thus, choosing a partner 
was of the highest importance, given the typical low rate of attrition and long-term 
relationships for which the firm was quite successful in selecting partners.180 The 
number-one pool for merchant banks from which to choose its partners was relatives.181 
Besides family, having done business before with another firm attracted top talent who 
more likely than not was in the same social circle.182 
The ability to trust and have confidence is one of the most important factors 
underpinning the economy at the turn of the 20th century and in developing the large-cap 
US multinational corporation, which the House of Morgan possessed in the highest order 
and in which it invested its social capital in its corporate concerns to develop the US 
multinational. The House of Morgan could leverage its social standing further through 
use of syndicates, which rested on its partners broader reputation within society.183 
Morgan and his partners promoted a community of interest contrary to the cutthroat 
survival of the fittest mentality espoused from Herbert Spencer.184 Financial cooperation 
was served best through global syndicates. 
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Cooperative Finance 
Syndicates were essentially a temporary corporation and allowed bankers’ ability 
to limit and diversify risk.185 Similar to merchant banking, being involved in a syndicate 
was a delicate situation based on trust; companies that fulfilled their promises were often 
invited back for future deals.186 At the turn of the 20th century, capital needs of 
multinationals required a further expansion of syndicate operation to cover the issuance 
of securities to join resources for new issuances.187 It’s important to note that bankers had 
a much more respected reputation in society and with potential investors compared with 
their multinational clients.188 At the turn of 20th century, merchant bankers abiding by a 
cooperative industry business model of respecting other banks’ established clients and 
territory developed a very profitable industry.189 Morgan considered unrestricted 
competition in both the exclusive world of merchant banking and other publicly traded 
industries not only wasteful of resources but destructive to the underlying economy.190!
Power rested with the few at the center of the syndicates, as they were the ones putting 
deals together, and assessing risk and opportunities of the transaction.191 
At the center of the system globally was the House of Morgan who by the start of 
the Great War was at the nexus of roughly forty percent of all US capital when including 
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its partnering organizations.192 In total the House of Morgan’s syndicate work was 
unmatched, with approximately $4.3 billion directly managed and over $3.5 billion given 
to the New York firm from syndicate partners between 1894 and 1914 alone.193 
Morgan and the select few conducted the syndicates under the gentlemen banker’s 
code honed from years in operation in the London world markets. The syndicates were 
monitored and maintained by a broader community of shared interests and values; given 
lack of legal contracts it was informal and not overly regulated by the state.194 Similar to 
what the merchant bankers preached to their clients, these same bankers were cooperating 
in their industry for years between competitors. The system worked as the participants 
respected and followed the gentlemen banker’s code.195 Ultimately, the syndicate system 
was instrumental in the pooling of resources and diversifying risk for the multinationals 
capital needs and would dominate the issuance of corporate securities.196 
In a community of shared interest, what would seem like partners who never work 
together added the most value for a syndicate. Despite radically different social circles, 
the global captains of industry, including the Rothschilds in Europe, Rockefeller interests 
in Ohio, Carnegie in Pittsburg, or German-Jewish immigrants at Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in 
New York, all were not members of the same social circle, yet still frequently did 
business with the House of Morgan. The power and ability of the House of Morgan to 
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coordinate across society came not from a homogenous social circle in dealing with 
business but from the diversity of its business network.197 Kuhn, Loeb & Co. whose 
members were, by and large, German-Jewish immigrants and not members of the same 
social circle still frequently did business with the House of Morgan, and in fact was 
leading syndicate partner to deals offered to Morgan’s partners.198 The conducting of 
business utilizing powerful syndicates allowed the House of Morgan to take on larger 
deals, foster new relationships and gather market leading information from its largest 
competitors, like Kuhn, Loeb & Co.199 The House of Morgan was also frequently 
involved with the venerable House of Rothschild in Europe who commanded the largest 
capital pool in Europe.200 A way to promote the cooperative environment that the 
Morgan’s preferred, was being interlocked within the dominant financial centers as a key 
strategy. 
 
Financial Centers 
The House of Morgan would be leveraging its unmatched syndicates in the major 
economic hubs to meet the needs of its government and business clients. New York 
emerged as the large-cap US multinational corporate headquarters, not surprising given 
its status as commercial, social and financial capital by the turn of the 20th century. The 
House of Morgan was deeply involved in all major aspects of New York. However, the 
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greatest contribution was running a successful global merchant bank boosting New York 
to second largest international economic center.201 The House of Morgan interlocked with 
the leading financial firms within New York as shareholders and on their corporate 
boards.202 
The House of Morgan’s capital resources were greatly amplified by interlocking 
boards in largest institutions.203 National City and First National Bank were the two most 
important commercial banks in terms of capital and leading syndicate partners for the 
House of Morgan.204 They worked frequently together on behalf of US multinationals 
locally and in developing economies.205 National City also known as Rockefeller’s Bank 
given that it supported Standard Oil operations and had extensive relationships with 
Kuhn, Loeb Co. (the oil baron preferred US merchant bank), had the largest deposit base 
of any commercial bank and was first to go overseas once it was allowed by the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913. The House of Morgan was very much connected with National 
City. The Morgan family was one of the largest shareholders and Morgan partners such 
as Robert Bacon and George Perkins served on the board of National City.206 
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An even closer bond was held between Morgan’s firm and First National Bank, 
especially between the firm’s two leaders—George Baker and J.P. Morgan—dating back 
to the 1870s until J.P. Morgan’s death.207 J.P. Morgan was a director of First National 
Bank and its largest outside shareholder.208 In fact, upon Morgan’s passing in 1913 
instructions were left to have George Baker, an outsider to the House of Morgan’s 
partnership, to help settle potential disputes within the firm’s partners, which highlights 
the close bond and trust between the two.209 First National Bank was deeply 
interconnected with large corporations, exemplified by George Baker, who sat on over 
forty boards, including railroads, steel, and utilities.210 
Another key industry that commanded a significant pool of assets with which 
Morgan’s partners was interlocked was insurance. The life insurance industry needed 
private bankers in order to purchase considerable securities essential to their core 
business.211 The three main insurance companies were all interlocked with the House of 
Morgan.212 A Morgan partner, George Perkins, illustrates the close relationship while 
also serving as chairman of New York Life Insurance Company’s finance committee.213 
Morgan’s relationship was even stronger with Equitable Life Assurance Company, 
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owning a controlling stake and Mutual Life Insurance, which included Morgan’s partner 
William H. Porter among its board members.214 
The Trust companies also had great pools of assets and were equally within the 
Morgan gambit. Morgan partners such as George Perkins,215 Henry P. Davison,216 
Thomas W. Lamont,217 and William H. Porter218 served on the boards of each of the other 
great trust companies, including Astor Trust, Bankers Trust and New York Trust. The 
largest trust, Guaranty Trust, which boasted 160 separate directorships,219 was effectively 
controlled by the House of Morgan having two partners as members of its voting trust.220 
The firm’s close relationships with other private banks in Boston were invaluable, 
especially those with Lee, Higginson & Co., who ranked among the leaders in active 
syndicates with the House of Morgan.221 Lee, Higginson & Co. had deep and long 
relationship with prominent executives and financial institutions in New England.222 
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Kidder, Peabody was also a leading syndicate partner for the House of Morgan who was 
invaluable for its London connections as Baring Brothers’ agent in the US.223 
Internationally the House of Morgan boasted the strongest connections among US 
merchant bankers, including the leading US agent for the world’s financial capital. The 
British Empire dwarfed all others in terms of global investing; by the start of World War 
I exports of capital of roughly $20 billion were greater compared with foreign 
investments of the rest of the world combined, with nearly one third of London’s 
investment being direct.224 Since the founding of US, British investors would play a 
leading role in the development of business operations and this trend continued with the 
development of the US multinational. Between the years of 1870 and 1914, Great Britain 
provided about 55-60% of total foreign capital invested in the United States.225 There 
were many other reasons why London would play such a leading role in developing the 
US multinational besides financial. Great Britain had the greatest migration from United 
Kingdom to the United States from between the Napoleonic War and start of World War 
I.226 This would make London a natural business partner for many US companies given 
their shared culture and heritage and would promote an increase in trade. Not only was 
British foreign investment high, but it was also the leading host for foreign multinationals 
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among all other world powers.227 Increasingly, American companies would establish 
factories in Great Britain in a wide range of sectors, including telecom and electricity 
equipment aided by the House of Morgan.228 
The House of Morgan’s close ties to London would prove to be one of its largest 
advantages throughout the century.229 What was unique was that the Morgan banking 
origins were British but run by Americans overseas, and prior to the 1890s, the London 
arm was the principal driver of the House of Morgan, not New York. The firm was the 
largest financial agent for British investors in the United States and would in turn service 
the large-cap US multinationals that conducted operations there.230 The original founders 
of leading US concerns such as General Electric (Thomas Edison), International 
Harvester (Cyrus McCormick), and US Steel (Andrew Carnegie) all worked with 
London’s branch first during the 19th century, not New York. The House of Morgan 
would bridge wealthy British investors with the rapidly expanding but higher-risk U.S. 
markets, focusing mostly on U.S. municipalities and government securities first before 
corporate securities. The House of Morgan was the largest seller of American securities 
in London from the US by the start of World War I. Britain was one of the leading and 
first stop locations to set up overseas for US multinationals given shared culture, which 
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lowered information costs and for those who were seeking established markets contrary 
to exploiting natural resources as in Mexico.231 
The House of Morgan had one of its four unincorporated and also the smallest 
based in France—only behind the British Empire with international investment.232 
However, French investment in general was more an extension of its politics directly in 
European nations, such as Russia, contrary to any meaningful investment in US 
multinationals.233 After Great Britain, no other nation overseas had as much influence on 
the development of the large-cap US multinational than Germany. A major factor was 
that Germany already had a large population in the US who served as intermediaries for 
German investors.234 Morgan’s ties with Germany came more from its syndicate work 
with the venerable Kuhn, Loeb & Co. who would be principal competitor and syndicate 
partner with the House of Morgan. Among syndicate partners dividing up work, Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co. was the leader outside of Morgan, and they had frequently partnered 
together.235 Led by Jacob Schiff, the firm would be investment bankers for Standard Oil 
and leading syndicate partner for German private and commercial banks. One of the key 
reasons why the House of Morgan was at the center of the global financial syndicate 
network and high demand among budding large-cap multinational companies to work 
with them generally made economic sense given its strong historical results. 
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!
Morgan Results 
The venerable House of Morgan uniquely served as a confidante and merchant 
bank for the wealthiest families, the largest US companies, and the most powerful 
nations. The House of Morgan generally brought down the cost of financing, increased 
liquidity, improved profit measures, traded at higher valuation multiples and led to 
stronger stock returns versus commensurate companies.236 Morgan-backed companies 
were more liquid and less sensitive to cash flow concerns versus proportionate companies 
not affiliated with Morgan.237 When capital markets were tight following financial 
panics, large multinationals increased their demands on the most venerable of merchant 
banks such as the House of Morgan. 
The House of Morgan did not just help with liquidity and financing costs—
Morgan companies had nearly twice as much gross earnings compared with non-Morgan 
affiliated organizations.238 The Morgan-led reorganizations showed strong results that 
were evident with the railroads, whose total returns from 1901 to 1910 for rails was 121% 
and following the panic of 1907 less than 5% rails was in receivership, dramatically less 
than the roughly 25% following the panic of 1893.239 Morgan-backed companies with a 
partner on a board in turn traded at higher valuation multiples.240 The strong results for 
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the company aided in solid stock returns. House of Morgan added 30% to common stock 
equity having at least one board member who was a partner in client firms from 1910 to 
1912, owing to stellar fundamental improvements.241 Strong results only enhanced the 
firm’s ability to attract capital and raised its partners overall social standing. The House 
of Morgan’s partners leading social capital and immense financial pool were leveraged in 
supporting the broader governance of the United States. 
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Chapter IV 
House of Morgan Political Capital 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, the House of Morgan was the leading supplier of 
funds to the US Government, the ambassadors from Wall Street, chief promoters of a 
gold standard, lender of last resorts, and leading supplier of international intelligence. 
The House of Morgan built up substantial political capital by fostering a cooperative 
approach to supporting the US government interests and further promoted its broader 
community of interests leveraging the government authority. Cooperating both locally 
and abroad allowed the US Federal Government to expand its scope of manifest destiny 
and raise its status with world powers. The House of Morgan was also able to have a 
profound impact on shaping policy and laws, including crafting leading regulation with 
the ICC in 1887, a series of laws in New Jersey for state incorporation, and the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913. These laws fostered with political capital built up over years would 
provide for a home base for the large multinational corporations, a more stable operating 
environment, and increased opportunities to raise funding and greater protection during 
future financial panics. Working with the Nation States has been a staple of merchant 
banking for centuries and obtaining political capital has been a natural byproduct of its 
services. 
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Wall Street and Politics 
Legislative capital is unique in that it is embedded in ongoing social relationships 
with governmental institutions.242 However, political capital does share common aspects 
with other forms of capital’s being productive in that it makes possible realization of 
interests otherwise impossible.243 Politics is of vital importance for multinational 
corporations given the significance of the Nation State on the economy via regulations, 
tariffs, and law enactment impacting competition.244 Powerful business interests being 
involved in politics were seen by leading capitalist interests throughout US history. A 
long-time chairman of the Democratic National Committee was August Belmont a 
former US representative for the House of Rothschild.245 The Republican Party at the turn 
of the 20th century was led by the long-time friend of John D. Rockefeller, Mark 
Hanna.246 
Morgan partners were very much involved in politics, similar to that of the 
Rothschilds who were well-connected in both major British parties of the time.247 The 
House of Morgan had strong family ties with politics. On J.P. Morgan’s maternal side of 
the family helped found the future states of Connecticut and Massachusetts. The Morgans 
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on their maternal side were also related to previous Vice President Aaron Burr. Arthur 
Newbold’s family included a former vice president and ambassador to Great Britain.248 
William Pierson Hamilton was the grandson of US founding father Alexander 
Hamilton,249 Charles Steele’s family included several ambassadors and an attorney 
general of the United States.250 George S. Bowdoin’s grandfather James was a governor 
of Massachusetts.251 The families of London partners, Walter Spencer Morgan Burns, 
Edward Charles Grenfell, Vivian Hugh Smith, and Charles Frederick Whigham were all 
prominent in British politics. 
The Morgan partners’ political connection was very much evident with their close 
historical relationships with US presidents. Ulysses S. Grant, Republican president 
(1869-1877), was close friends of Tony Drexel, head of the Philadelphia partnership for a 
number of years. Tony Drexel was offered the role of Secretary of Treasury first by 
President Grant, was consulted regularly on financial matters throughout his two terms, 
including Tony Drexel’s giving the sound currency argument used by Grant for veto in 
April 1874 against potential inflation.252 Tony Drexel helped raise funds for Grant’s 
family on several occasions, including throwing extensive galas on his behalf. Drexel on 
a personal level oversaw some Grant family private investments and was a pallbearer at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248“Arthur E. Newbold, Noted Financier, Dies Unexpectedly,” New York Tribune, June 11, 1920, 
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/576236673?accountid=11311. 
249“W. Pierson Hamilton Retires,” Wall Street Journal, Jan 2, 1922, 
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/130075631?accountid=11311. 
250“Charles Steele Dies,” New York Herald Tribune, Aug 6, 1939, http://search.proquest.com.ezp-
prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/1243141004?accountid=11311. 
251“George S. Bowdoin Dead at 80 Years,” New York Tribune, Dec 17,1913,!
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/575190166?accountid=11311. 
252Rottenberg, The Man Who Made Wall Street, 117. 
64 
!
!
 
his funeral.253 Grover Cleveland, Democratic president (1885-1889, 1893-1897), a 
staunch advocate of the gold standard and a railroad lawyer, spent virtually his whole 
career in the Morgan circles. This included serving as a partner at the House of Morgan’s 
personal law firm— Bangs, Stetson, Tracey, and MacVeagh— between his two 
presidential terms, which housed Charles B. Tracey (J. P. Morgan’s brother-in-law) and 
the Morgan’s “attorney general” Francis Lynde Stetson.254 The Morgan backed syndicate 
would lead a vital gold rescue during his second term and was pivotal in preventing the 
panic of 1893 from becoming a deep depression. 
Theodore Roosevelt, Republican president (1901-1909), and the Morgan family 
the relationship of the families went back many years; Theodore Roosevelt’s father and 
J.P. Morgan helped found the Museum of Natural History together.255 The House of 
Morgan would lend its support to Roosevelt for his reelection bid by being one of his 
leading financial donors.256 Roosevelt’s administration further highlights his close ties 
with the House of Morgan further with Elihu Root, an attorney for J.P. Morgan and 
Robert Bacon, a Morgan partner, and being one of his Secretaries of State while in 
office.257 Morgan’s partners were deeply involved during Roosevelt’s administration, 
including driving the gold standard internationally, promoting dollar diplomacy and 
playing a pivotal role in preventing the Panic of 1907 from becoming more severe. 
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Woodrow Wilson, Democratic president (1913-1921), obtained his main financial 
support from George Harvey and Cyrus H. McCormick, heads of Harper & Brothers and 
International Harvester respectively, both Morgan controlled operations.258 Morgan’s 
partners years beforehand spearheaded the creation of the Federal Reserve which Wilson 
signed into law in 1913. Wilson would rely heavily on the House of Morgan during 
World War I as fiscal agent for the Allies and as leaders of the Red Cross, which was the 
largest humanitarian effort in Europe during World War I. 
Key Morgan-backed personnel would increasingly attain positions of power 
within the government itself, which would strengthen the bond with the Federal 
Government, was consistent with service to the community, gave the firm a distinction of 
being a quasi-government institution, and allowed the firm to better support both its 
clients and government interests. Morgan’s partners who had leading political influence 
directly went across party lines. Robert Bacon was Secretary of State, Ambassador to 
France, and was deeply involved in military affairs.259 Edward T. Stotesbury was 
Treasurer of the Republican National Committee in Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign in 
1904 and the Taft campaign in 1908.260 Dwight Morrow became an ambassador to 
Mexico.261 George W. Perkins organized Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive Party and 
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remained leading progressive voice until his death.262 In London, Sir Clinton Dawkins 
was private secretary to Chancellor of the Exchequer, financial member of the council of 
the Governor General for India and Undersecretary for Finance in Egypt.263 Edward 
Charles Grenfell was a member in Parliament.264 Vivian Hugh Smith was a member of 
the House of Lords.265 The rise of big business did not just coincide with growth of the 
US federal government and but also vastly larger military with consummate increase in 
defense spending. 
 
Military Connections 
Increasingly, the US was taking on a large military operation consummate with its 
economic size, allowing for range of benefits for multinationals such as new military 
advancements to be applied to commercial uses to opening up new avenues of trade. The 
House of Morgan’s banks, like other private elites, had a long history with government 
military funding and rose to power thanks greatly to preparations for war, the fighting of 
wars, and the reconstruction after war.266 Drexel & Co. was the leader in financing the 
Mexican War in 1847, raising roughly 49 million dollars.267 The House of Morgan’s 
biggest opportunity came as the leader in the massive $1.4 billion US Civil War 
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refunding in the 1870s and would remain a leading private bank in government funding 
for the US Federal Government until World War I.268 The House of Morgan would 
support the military not only financially but in other ways as well, including in 1877, 
Drexel Morgan’s paying the army’s salary until Congress came around to do so.269 The 
US was not the only superpower whose war efforts depended on the House of Morgan. 
Great Britain came to rely on the House of Morgan to raise funds during the Boer War in 
South Africa at the turn of the 20th century.270 Morgan’s partner Edward Charles Grenfell 
would lead the Anglo-French Loan in 1916 and sold British owned American securities 
in the US during World War I as well.271 These operations were not only very profitable 
but increased prestige for the House of Morgan, which gained further business clients and 
also increased its selling syndicates for future corporate dealings.272 
The House of Morgan built up a significant amount of political capital from its 
close role with powerful defense leaders.273 George S. Bowdoin’s grandfather was 
American Revolution General Phillip Schuyler.274 William P. Hamilton’s grandfather 
was Major General Alexander Hamilton.275 Confederate Army General Robert E. Lee 
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and Union Army General Ulysses S. Grant would both join Morgan’s partner George 
Peabody in supporting education revitalization in the war-torn South led by the Peabody 
Education Fund.276 General John J. Pershing led the American forces during World War I 
with his chief civilian aide of staff Morgan’s partner Dwight Morrow.277 Morgan’s 
partner Robert Bacon would serve as the President of the National-Security League, early 
advocate of US entering the Great War, and as a colonel to General Pershing’s staff.278 
Edward T. Stotesbury received the Medal of Honor for his active support of several 
projects in France during World War I.279 Henry P. Davison became honorary 
commander of the French Legion of Honor for his leadership of Red Cross during World 
War I.280 Thomas Lamont was integral in helping set up the future Council on Foreign 
Relations. Within London, Sir Clinton E. Dawkins chaired the Committee on War Office 
Reorganization and received his Knighthood in 1904.281 French partner John Henry 
Harjes was made an officer of the Legion of Honor in 1902. Henry Herman Harjes 
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organized a liaison service between the French Army and the A.E.F. and would perform 
as a Lieutenant Colonel.282 
The House of Morgan was counted on to raise capital during times of war, best 
illustrated during World War I. The firm would finance and supply leading European 
powers during World War I as their chief American fiscal and purchasing agent for Great 
Britain, France, Russia, and Italy.283 During World War I, a staggering 40% of British 
war expenditures were spent in North America, totaling $18 billion by Great Britain and 
another $6 billion by France that Morgan made on their behalf.284 It is important to note 
that in an effort to reign in cost and increase overall efficiency, the House of Morgan was 
the sole purchasing agent in the US. Morgan’s partners Thomas Lamont, Edward 
Sttinius, and Charles Whinham took charge of purchasing goods for the British 
government during World War I.285 The US State Department made a shift starting in the 
1890s that would continue until World War I, with the goal of pushing goods produced 
by Americans around the world and the House of Morgan was the leading organization in 
promoting these objectives as well.286 
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Dollar Diplomacy 
With “Manifest Destiny” being largely accomplished with the taming of the West, 
America was quickly looking overseas to exploit new opportunities and assert its 
economic muscle at the turn of the 20th century. This can be seen with America’s 
annexation of Hawaii, its intervention in the Boxer rebellion, the seizure of Panama, the 
occupation of Nicaragua, the World Tour of the Navy Fleet, and military intervention in 
Mexico. This was in a large measure due to the aiding of American business interests, 
such as in Hawaii as a new channel for trade and the Philippines as the foothold for 
expansion into the Orient.287 
Wall Street, led by Morgan with its close political ties and financial connections, 
would play a pivotal role in US foreign policy and aid in the growth of large-cap 
multinationals, using cooperation to reach a common objective with the government of 
expanding trade and influence. The firm sponsored some of the first external government 
loans to be sold in the United States and thus had strong foreign connections. The French 
Loan of 1870 puts J.S. Morgan on the map when it came to large international loans.288 
Latin America would be a place for increasing importance, with Morgan’s partners the 
key US merchant banker.289 Morgan’s partners further handled loans for Mexico and 
Canada, two of the leading destinations for US multinationals to set up operations.290 
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The Department of State Dollar Diplomacy was intended to bring prosperity, 
sound government, and pro-American politics to developing countries and reduce the 
chances of other world powers from intervening. From the 1890s through Woodrow 
Wilson’s terms, presidential cabinets viewed such policies as a preferable option to 
outright imperialism and worked closely with the House of Morgan, which acted as a 
foreign lending arm for the US government.291 The Morgan’s unrivaled international 
political connections would both serve in expanding global trade and in ultimately 
helping to shape the borders in which companies were working.292 The House of Morgan 
was called upon to support American interests in China under US Open-Door Policy.293 
In 1909, $30 million in a loan was made to China in order to build Hukuang Railway, 
organized by a powerful syndicate with the House of Morgan at the center.294 The House 
of Morgan was also deeply involved in the Panama Canal transaction, both with its 
French and NY operations carrying out the $40 million financing for the then largest real 
estate deal ever made.295 Overseas the House of Morgan was also influential in London’s 
politics as well. 
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Morgan Partners and London 
Merchant Bankers’ ties with the British Empire’s government were around for 
generations. This was the case with Europe’s largest financial house, the Rothschilds, 
who had strong relationships with both Liberal and Tory officials.296 British partner, Sir 
Clinton E. Dawkins was exclusive secretary to Chancellor of the Exchequer George 
Foschen, Undersecretary for Finance in Egypt and private secretary in India to Lord 
Cross, Secretary of State in India.297 While another of London’s key partners such as 
Edward Charles Grenfell was a Member of Parliament,298 Vivian Hugh Smith the 
chairman of City Conservative party,299 and Charles Frederick Whigham negotiated the 
purchase of millions of dollars of materials for Allies during World War I.300 
The House of Morgan was deeply interconnected with the Bank of England. 
Members of the Bank of England who were, likewise, Morgan partners, included Edward 
Grenfell,301 while the families of Vivian Hugh Smith302 and Charles Frederick 
Whigham303 further had directors on the Bank of England. The Morgan promotion of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
296Niall Ferguson, The House of Rothschild: The World’s Bankers 1849-1999 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1998), 114. 
297“Sir Clinton E. Dawkins Dead,” New York Tribune, Dec 3, 1905, 
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/571646816?accountid=11311. 
298Chernow, House of Morgan, 104. 
299Ibid., 272. 
300“British Banker Dies in Hunting Accident,” New York Times, Feb 13, 1938, 
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/102700403?accountid=11311. 
301Chernow, House of Morgan, 104. 
302Ibid., 272. 
303“British Banker Dies in Hunting Accident,” New York Times, Feb 13, 1938, 
http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/102700403?accountid=11311. 
73 
!
!
 
gold standard was also in turn supporting pound sterling stability and broader security for 
the world economy.304 Later after the Federal Reserve was created, Morgan’s men would 
stay very much involved with the Bank of England, increasingly discussing policy with 
the Bank of England’s dominant Governor Norman.305 The House of Morgan would 
increase its prestige by servicing the British Empire for loans needed for the Boer War by 
dealing with senior government officials and increasing its chance for future business 
opportunities.306 Working with London further increased Morgan’s prestige with outside 
corporations and brought in new business from other sovereigns in Africa and 
Australasia.307 
The extent of Morgan’s relationships with London could be seen at the outbreak 
of World War I. Given perceived windfall profits for some of the previous US 
middlemen, the Allied powers concentrated its purchases—roughly half of all American 
sales during the war— in a single agency through the venerable House of Morgan.308 
Following the Great War, Morgan partners’ influence was seen strongly in shaping the 
post-war world at the Paris Peace Conference in dominating many of the most important 
committees whose recommendation reports were nearly universally adopted by the 
Supreme Council.309  Furthermore, after World War I “Round Table Groups” started 
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forming in British dependencies, London with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
and the United States with the Council on Foreign Relations, which generally promoted a 
forum for learning about global issues and experts supporting a more integrated world; 
with Morgan’s partners deeply immersed in the process.310 While policy was linking the 
world together, another form in promoting an interconnected society was provided by the 
rapid advances in technology, illustrated by the rails development. 
 
Rails 
The transportation revolution was driven by rapidly expanding technologies such 
as steam with ships but none more important than the rails. The US Government viewed 
the development of the rails as a public good, and would provide over 100 million acres 
of public land in the 19th century available for the rails in their desire to shrink the US 
landscape and enhance commercial business opportunities.311 The railroad was not only 
effective in shrinking the world but also in expanding the economy. Overland 
transportation had always been expensive and burdensome for businessmen; they would 
instead turn to the sea to exploit trading opportunities—for example, three thousand miles 
from Europe cost a shipper the same for a ton of goods compared with inland travel in the 
US east coast of just thirty miles as late as 1816.312 However, the railroads would change 
all of that given their speed, all season usage, and the fact that rail tracks could go where 
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streams and canals could not.313 Making overland transportation a viable, cheap option 
opened up for companies throughout the nation that would be able to sell their products 
not only locally but also across great distances. Rails were also instrumental in promoting 
large-scale migration to the U.S. as cost to travel dropped dramatically. Railroads in 
particular, were very labor-intensive and would require a sizeable workforce, a quality 
that would become common later for other substantial corporations.314 The transportation 
revolutions additionally allowed for far greater ability to control assets and deal with 
partners for the newly forming large US multinational corporations given the narrowing 
of distances from a company’s headquarters to its various operations.315 
The rails would further become the model in many ways for the modern 
corporation by moving toward a multiunit manager lead model. Given the size and scope 
of the rail’s operations, with thousands of employees, greater specialization was 
encouraged for the workers with a new corporate style led by layers of management who 
were not the owners of the company but were, in theory, there to execute the owner’s 
vision.316 The rails also effectively opened up hundreds of millions of acres of farm land, 
which lowered cost for food products and developed an interconnected national sales 
market. 
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The rails required significant amounts of capital given rapid expansion and 
ongoing maintenance—with 72 thousand miles of railroad track in 1875, expanding to 
387 thousand miles by the start of World War 1.317 The railroads would play an 
instrumental role in the development of the capital markets in the U.S. that later were 
necessary for broader funding of future U.S. multinationals.318 Indeed, toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, it is hard to exaggerate the size of the rails, being by far the 
largest US sector in terms of bonds outstanding and common stock traded.319 While the 
rails were the largest publicly traded sector, they were in turn controlled by the financial 
industry, given how dependent they were on capital. The bankers would be increasingly 
be seen on boards and in time be the leading voice on the corporate boards.320 
The largest of these firms was the House of Morgan, which controlled more 
railroad track versus any other financial firm, reaching 1/3 of railroad track by the turn of 
the 20th century.321 The House of Morgan was the consistent leaders in railroad finance 
from the 1850s through the turn of the 20th century. This started first with the 
development of unconnected lines in various states to an integrated regional and 
continental network.322 The House of Morgan was not just involved in new security 
issuances; it was also called in to help with the frequent economic struggles of the highly 
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leveraged rails through reorganizations.323 During the 1890s, the insolvent rails operated 
almost 41,000 miles of track with a total capitalization of some $2.5 billion and 
represented about one-fourth of the country’s entire rail system.324 The House of Morgan 
would take the reins of a troubled company by first significantly scaling back costs, 
refinancing its debt, often merging it with a fiscally sounder company and taking a board 
seat to have ongoing oversight.325 The Morgan’s partners overriding goal when 
reorganizing the rails was to protect the interest of security holders, but more importantly 
to promote stability within the industry through greater cooperation and adherence to 
community interest principles.326 Morgan’s approach to the rails, cooperative industry’s 
approach to curtailing price wars and adding more stability, was in direct contrast to more 
speculative investors, including Jay Gould whose goal was maximizing shareholder 
value.327 The Morgan’s partners leading status in London was of great aid in developing 
the railroads, which were very tied to the British Empire—starting with leading bankers 
facilitating iron imports to being the largest financial house international investor in the 
rails by the turn of the 20th century.328 The House of Morgan took representation of its 
investors seriously as it also tied into the broader honor of the firm.329 The rails initial 
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development in both London and the US came about partially from the search for more 
natural resources, especially coal.330 
 
Natural Resources 
The Industrial Revolution in the U.S. marked a sea change in the use of power, 
from a self-sustaining organic economy that utilized humans or animals for energy 
production to one that was dependent on minerals released through a nonliving machine 
such as the steam engine.331 Coal, oil, iron ore would not only fuel needed transportation 
for rapidly expanding production, but would also provide the materials to build 
production plants to manufacturing facilities. Financing global trade by nature keeps an 
investment bank constantly updated on commodity prices and deeply immersed within 
their markets. 
Morgan’s interest was very active in commodities since the 1850s with British 
iron traded for US rail creation. The House of Morgan financed trade in a large variety of 
commodities, including used for consumption such as spices, coffee, wheat, sugar, to 
those used in energy production and a whole range of petroleum products.332 The House 
of Morgan also had corporate interest in the natural resources’ space given its interest in 
US Steel’s—world’s largest public company at the time—massive demand for range of 
commodities, including coal, iron ore, steel scrap in order to produce steel.333 The firm 
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was earlier on the promoter of the Caucasus Copper Company, which developed copper 
mining properties.334 A far larger interest was the House of Morgan’s work with the 
Guggenheim family to exploit the Alaskan territory with a $15 million-dollar syndicate, 
which came to own the majority of stakes in the region ranging from copper mines to 
coal lands.335 Consummate with the development of the rails and the world-wide search 
for commodities, were the implementation of faster ways to communicate which further 
deepen the interconnectivity of the world. 
 
Communications 
The House of Morgan was also instrumental in the development of broader 
communication technology. American Telephone & Telegraph, which relied on Boston 
private bankers during its formation, increasingly shifted to depending on the House of 
Morgan and principally under its modern formation in 1906.336 More instrumental, the 
House of Morgan was the principal US financial backer of Cyrus W. Field’s laying the 
first transatlantic cable starting in the 1850s and ultimately completed in 1866 under the 
Atlantic Telegraph Company.337 The House of Morgan had the power of attorney for 
Cyrus W. Field, served as American proxy, and roughly 75% of the company’s funding 
came from London which benefited from the Morgan partners’ overseas relationships.338 
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Communication from the US and London, which had taken weeks beforehand, now was 
being made instantaneously via the telegraph messages. 
The House of Morgan was not only involved with the speed of communications 
but with the content of communications through mass media. Newspapers, books, 
magazines were reaching larger more centralized audiences now increasingly based in 
cities. This allowed a strong forum for companies to get their messages out to the public 
in regards to the company to editorials shaping how companies would be perceived. The 
head of the Philadelphia partnership, Anthony J. Drexel owned the Philadelphia Public 
Ledger newspaper along with friend George William Childs towards the end of the Civil 
War. Childs, through Drexel financial backing  was one of the nation’s most venerable 
book publishers, with a particular focus on religious and scientific books used in schools. 
Philadelphia Public Ledger became one of the preeminent journals in the US boasting 
one of the largest circulations during the latter part of the 19th century.339 The House of 
Morgan bailed out and took dominant control of the US’s oldest book publisher 
following the panic of 1893, Harper & Brothers.340 Harpers & Brothers had four of the 
more widely read magazines under its umbrella and remained a noted book publisher into 
the early 20th century.341 Willard D. Straight from the House of Morgan financially 
funded the very influential New Republic starting in 1914.342 In 1918 Morgan partner, 
Thomas W. Lamont, purchased another well-known news publisher, the New York 
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Evening Post, which traced its origins to Alexander Hamilton.343 The media was not only 
informative in purchasing decisions, but also creating awareness of perceived 
inappropriate practices of corporations, a key driver in fostering many of the new 
regulations. 
 
Regulation 
One view of regulation it is that is designed and operated for the best interest of 
the underlying industry it is intended to monitor.344 In this case, the principal aims and 
uses of regulation allowed for a more balanced landscape and determined entry of new 
firms into the playing field.345 The goal for companies with such large capital outlays and 
dominant market share was for uniform pricing and stable rate of returns to be bolstered 
through increased federal regulation.346 The House of Morgan promoted domestic 
regulation as well that would protect large US multinational corporations and big 
business interest from further ruinous competition and better enactment of private 
agreements. The Morgan partners had always had a preference for planning over “hands 
off” competition. Business cooperation would be the first approach followed by 
government planning if needed.347 
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Starting with the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 was decisive in terms of future 
corporate regulation as the first regulatory commission and was requested by big business 
in order to bring a more stable operating environment and was orchestrated by the House 
of Morgan. The act was momentous as it would lead to an increasing trend of government 
involvement in business operations.348 Following the passage of the legislation during the 
coming years, J.P. Morgan would continue to organize and host private gatherings at his 
home to promote cooperation and stability among the railway operators who had 
previously operated on their own accord.349 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 would 
deter cooperative arrangements, such as cartels and pools which in turn promoted a full-
scale merger between competitors through the development of multinational corporations 
organization but would promote full-scale corporate mergers.350 It was Morgan’s lawyers 
who also wrote up the increasing business contractual framework during this time that 
would be adopted by future multinationals, led by Morgan’s “attorney general” Francis 
Lynde Stenson.351 It was Morgan’s top lawyers, Francis Lynde Stenson’s and William 
Nelson Cromwell’s long-term work with the rails’ reorganizations and merger and 
actions of multinationals such as US Steel and International Harvester that would be a 
corporate legal blue print for budding multinationals for years to come. These same legal 
minds and ally politicians were also instrumental in developing tariff friendly protections 
for US big business. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
348Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” 4.!
349Chernow, House of Morgan, 56-57. 
350Cassis, “Big Business,” 178. 
351Carosso, The Morgans, 366. 
83 
!
!
 
 
Tariffs 
The established contacts and global syndicates that developed leverage for 
dealings were used to support its growing list of multinationals’ clients, where it financed 
trade and dealt in foreign exchange.352 The House of Morgan was linked to both parties at 
both a personal level of having men inside the office and at a business level in servicing 
governments, both domestically and abroad. Tariffs long were a hot-button issue in 
American politics split along party lines. Republicans overwhelmingly supported greater 
trade protection with Democrats opposed. While the turn of the 20th century was 
remarkably open in many respects, tariffs were customarily high and that is the way big 
business generally wanted it to protect their industries from overseas competition.353 This 
was clear in the Dingley Act or the Tariff Act of 1897, which was both the longest lasting 
tariff in US history at 12 years and also had the highest rates, averaging 47%.354 
In fact, high tariffs in the late nineteenth century in the US and sections of Europe 
were one of the key reasons multinationals set up operations abroad and would turn first 
to the leading merchant banks, most especially the House of Morgan.355 Steep tariffs in 
the US encouraged greater direct investment from international concerns with overseas 
companies manufacturing in the US rather than dealing with high tariffs on exports.356 
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Overseas tariffs caused US multinationals to go abroad in nations close by or with long 
cultural ties such as found in Europe, Canada, and Latin America.357 While companies 
were increasingly seeking operations and trade overseas, its underlying formation would 
remain a very local matter decided by the American states. 
 
State Incorporation 
The United States has a rich experience of companies developing its very being—
including the US’s oldest existing corporation, Harvard University chartered in 1636—to 
develop key infrastructure of the United States, including transportation, schools, banks 
and churches.358 However, there were merely just a few hundred corporations by 1800 as 
states/municipalities would continually rewrite charters with corporations, creating 
uncertainty and making the small private partnership’s business model more attractive for 
entrepreneurs and bankers. In the early 19th century, companies were typically single-
unit, focusing on one geographic location, while few employees and owners and 
managers were one and the same.359 Companies in the 1840s remained small business 
affairs despite a much more supportive legal framework as there was not yet an economic 
motive to build larger corporations.360 As the 19th century progressed, domestic 
companies would have increased markets to exploit at home and abroad given a 
transportation revolution and accompanying burdening trade. Following the US Civil 
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War the demand for a corporate organization to support a larger multiunit globally 
operating entity was in far greater demand. However, it was the American states and not 
the Federal Government that were the ruling authority under incorporation law, which 
determined the ability to operate across state lines to the authority to merge with another 
company.361 
There was no location more appealing than New Jersey for big business at the 
turn of the 20th century, with over 50% of US total consolidations greater than $1 million 
being incorporated in New Jersey representing a staggering 80% of the combination’s 
market cap and half of Moody 318 largest industrial trusts being incorporated in the 
Garden state.362 It was important to note that key Morgan lawyers were actively helping 
to shape the legal code of New Jersey. This includes William Nelson Cromwell who was 
involved in creating the legal code for devising the structures of modern large 
corporations and was closely involved in many Morgan back deals, which included the 
Panama Canal creation and helping to organize US Steel.363 William Nelson Cromwell 
when advising International Harvester to choose New Jersey for its incorporation had 
discussed a key benefit of New Jersey is that a syndicate of lawyers had been actively 
shaping the legal landscape to be very supportive to big business.364 The lawyers to 
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whom Cromwell is referring were led by James Brooks Dill, who was most pivotal in 
making New Jersey the capital for large corporations. 
James Brooks Dill worked with local politicians in liberalizing New Jersey 
statutes and by setting up The Corporation Trust Company, which had New Jersey 
Governor Leon Abbett and Secretary of State Henry Kelsey as directors who!would act as 
the agent for companies wishing to acquire New Jersey charters.365 Dill was strongly 
connected to the House of Morgan, with the Corporation Trust Company of New Jersey 
representing Morgan’s clients, including Federal Steel Company in New Jersey, the 
formerly largest organization in the state.366 In 1896, Dill wrote the General Corporation 
Act which was in simple language and showcased the many opportunities for 
corporations to incorporate in New Jersey.367 Their actions led to law changes made in 
1893 and earlier that allowed corporations to hold stock in other companies, both within 
the state and externally, allowing an increase in horizontal industry mergers.368 Close 
relationships thus developed between the finance community, lawyers and the state which 
was now dealing with corporations operating nationally such as Morgan’s clients 
International Harvester and US Steel locating in New Jersey. While locally a legal 
framework in New Jersey provided a retentively stable foundation for business to operate 
in, the gold standard increased stability for overseas trade for multinational organizations. 
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Gold Standard 
By the turn of the 20th century, the world’s largest markets were increasingly on 
the gold standard. Starting after 1879, the US was essentially on the gold standard until 
the early 20th century.369 The House of Morgan has had a long history of promoting gold 
and in fact, played a leading role in stabilizing the new gold standard in the United States 
by cooperating with the US government and financial syndicates. This started, in earnest, 
with a Morgan and Rothschild-led syndicate for $50 million in order for the US Treasury 
to return to the gold standard in 1879.370 The House of Morgan would continue to lead 
syndicates when necessary if gold stability was uncertain, which was shown during the 
panic of 1893 when securing the Treasury’s gold reserves with massive intervention.371 
The firm leveraged its global syndicate relationships overseas with the House of 
Rothschild and also with Deutsche Bank in 1895 to continue its supportive efforts for 
gold.372 
Gold held a unique position as the principal as the majority of the developed 
world money was expressed in its terms and would be the building block for fractional 
reserve banking in the US.373 Gold was increasingly being rapidly attracted to the US 
given in part to robust trade underpinned by surging manufacturing exports. The US 
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possessed 1/8 of the world’s stock of gold, 20% by 1900 and 25% in 1913.374 To increase 
gold reserves in the US and enhance New York banks in foreign exchange transactions, 
Morgan’s partners and Washington would work together on promoting a more deeply 
interconnected financial system.375 US foreign policy and large business interest would 
increasingly support the promotion of gold for several reasons, including the stabilization 
of exchange rates, the improvement of export trade and the increase of foreign investment 
in overseas markets.376 The House of Morgan and its peers were largely the driving force 
behind the gold promotion, including that to China, Mexico, the Philippines, and Puerto 
Rico to name a few. US multinationals largely supported these goals of gold-backed 
currency expansion for greater exchange rate / business stability.377 The House of 
Morgan’s partners leading involvement with gold extended naturally to provide the 
lender-of-last-resort role status needed within the US. 
 
Lender of Last Resort 
The House of Morgan’s families were deeply involved in central banking, 
including generations of directors within the Bank of England. Previous generations of 
Morgan’s relatives were instrumental in developing the first US central bank under the 
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leadership of Alexander Hamilton’s378 First Bank of the United States and Nicholas 
Biddle, being a leader of the Second Bank of the United States.379 The House of 
Morgan’s partners in the US would carry on a business and moral responsibility as 
“lender of last resort” during several financial panics, including a panic in 1884 where 
Morgan asserted himself in the leading role.380 Morgan would again come to the aid of 
markets following the panic of 1893, whose firm was considered more solvent and of a 
higher standing compared with United States Treasury by European investors.381 Besides 
moral responsibility, Morgan would gain increased prestige among the business 
community for his successful rescue plan.382 Further, panics tightening credit had an 
effect of money becoming tighter and a flight to safety and coming out of those economic 
downturns could get greater access to capital and help with potential corporate 
reorganizations.383 The House of Morgan would play an even larger role in the panic of 
1907 and helping to convince senior financial executives to muster up $25 million each to 
provide stability to banks in trouble.384 Following the Panic of 1907, there was now an 
increased focus on creating a central bank, which is what the financiers had wanted for 
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years, modeled after the Bank of England and German Reichsbank, which were designed 
to limit panics.385 
International bankers’ desire for a Central Bank in the US began, in earnest, 
following McKinley’s victory of silver advocated by William Jennings Bryan in 1896, 
which was seen as a big win for the gold standard. The Indianapolis Monetary 
Convention of 1897 was a large gathering of businessmen from 26 states.386 It promoted 
the gold standard and elastic bank credit, with several key Morgan allies organizing the 
gathering—meetings were presided over by C. Stuart Patterson (member of the Morgan-
oriented Pennsylvania Railroad) and George Foster Peabody (Boston banker close to the 
Morgans).387 Following the Panic of 1907, to aid in the process a Congressional 
commission was set up by Senator Aldrich, and in summer 1908 Morgan partners were 
asked to help set up meetings with the preeminent bankers in London, Paris and Berlin.388 
Future Morgan partner Henry P. Davison in 1908 was selected by the National Monetary 
Commission as the main expert.389 
The Federal Reserve System was intended to provide stable prices, lower 
inflation, and become the lender of last resort. The Federal Reserve Act also allowed 
national banks to set up international branches to service its multinational and local 
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clients, which would also aid US multinationals in trade.390 The passage of The Federal 
Reserve Act of December 23, 1913 was signed into law by President Woodrow Wilson 
with Benjamin Strong the preeminent Fed member in his role as Governor of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York for fourteen years. The creation of the Federal Reserve was 
not only in large measure thanks to the efforts of Morgan’s partners, but so was its 
operations. Morgan’s partner Henry P. Davidson was a mentor to Benjamin Strong, who 
came from the Morgan-controlled Bankers Trust Company.391 Until the start of the Great 
Depression, the House of Morgan was deeply involved in central bank policy both with 
the Federal Reserve and its dealings with the Bank of England.392 The House of 
Morgan’s partners were also focusing on providing increased stability within the 
economy through development, promotion, and strategic leadership of US large-cap 
multinationals. 
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Chapter V 
House of Morgan Organizes the US Multinational Corporation 
 
By serving a larger community need and utilizing a cooperative strategy, the 
House of Morgan helped develop the defining aspects of the large cap multinational 
corporation. It fostered global trade and international development leveraging an 
incremental strategy towards expansion built on their decades of trust as an honest broker 
for fair dealing. The shareholders and management of the new corporations were 
separated and in solving the principal-agent problem with the owners, had an effective 
board of directors representing their interest controlled often by their merchant bankers. 
Firms like Morgan were very active in setting, monitoring, and enforcing the strategic 
vision of companies representing their shareholders’ interests from selecting a 
management team to executing the board’s vision and providing an incentive structure to 
have employees best motivated to implement management orders. The large multiunit 
organizations with multiple distinct product lines were formed through acquisitions 
primarily during the great merger and acquisition wave during the turn of the 20th 
century, in which former rivals were now all under the same organization, and those once 
competing resources would be utilized to cooperate to move forward overseen by a 
hierarchy of paid managers running operations. Ongoing growth was promoted 
organically as well through the development of research and development centers. Public 
relations experts leveraged the best elements of these colossal organizations for a positive 
persona with consumers. However, it was trusted and reliable information that served as 
the focal point for internal and external decision makers. 
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Standardized Information 
Information is essential in order for companies to make decisions, but acquiring it 
is costly.393 It has been argued that the development of an organization’s structure is 
immensely influenced by high information costs.394 Quality trustworthy information is 
difficult to come by and to leverage for making business decisions. Vital information is 
needed before transaction costs can be taken on so as to appraise potential investments 
and to search for different production locations and, furthermore, to help determine the 
organization’s overall structure.395 Each phase in a business life cycle requires new 
information that will have a major impact on how that organization is structured. The 
multinational in the US gained wider acceptance as it allowed for a more efficient and 
cost-effective way to transfer information.396 
One of the most effective means for sharing information was through social 
relations.397 In an era before widespread regulation or greater corporate!transparency via 
financial statements, the impeccable reputation of the House of Morgan facilitated 
information sharing built on its pristine reputation and through its powerful 
relationships.398 Information, especially in the other parts of the world is vital for 
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corporations to conduct its operations overseas in order to calculate impending costs and 
make informed decisions on production given demand trends. Accurate and timely 
information was vital for budding investors and potential clients of multinationals to tap 
into a given lack of reliable public information.399 The House of Morgan was in a unique 
role in alleviating the problem of monitoring the corporations and control from the board 
managers through their active broker status.400 
Firms like Morgan’s were entrusted with very sensitive information from the 
world’s decision makers. The fact that the House of Morgan was four unincorporated 
partnerships allowed an all-important veil of secrecy as no financial reports needed to be 
filed, no shares were offered to the general public, and no real advertising for clients was 
done.401 The secrecy was needed on the nature of the role, as the House of Morgan would 
serve as a confidante for the wealthiest families, the largest companies, and the most 
influential nations. Its impressive global relationships and secrecy would serve the firm 
well in providing leading intelligence to its clients, ranging from US multinationals to 
governments.402 These informal but extensive worldwide intelligence networks of agents 
and correspondents of clients, lawyers, government officials were used effectively in 
building up the multinational. A foreign trade department supplied information to 
American business in overseas markets and foreign firms, which allowed firms to 
determine transoceanic investment and trade opportunities. 
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As companies were now employing tens of thousands of workers, in various 
operations in different divisions around the world, the trend to systematize pertained to 
information as well allowing for greater managerial control through consistent internal 
communications instead of ad-hoc dependence on individuals. A good example of 
standardized communications was in regard to financial statements, which became 
increasingly valuable by both internal managements for decision making and for 
investors to determine a company’s prospects. However, as financial reporting was far 
from a normal practice and even just a basic balance sheet was not common, except by 
clients represented by the House of Morgan—all of Morgan’s clients had published 
financial statements versus only 43% of the largest US industrials in 1899.403 In an era 
before the SEC and other regulatory bodies, the Morgan seal of approval was all the 
confidence investors needed, which was further enhanced with a Morgan board 
placement to ensure ongoing representation of operations and the Morgan partners’ 
promoting greater transparency of companies they represented. Financial reporting was 
integral for external shareholders to get a window into management’s information system 
and have reliable information that decision makers utilized.404 
A good example of the House of Morgan’s promoting more published 
information about their clients can be seen at their work in the accounting sector and their 
regular corporate audits. Morgan’s clients were regularly audited by the English 
accounting firm Price Waterhouse before and after major transactions. Price Waterhouse 
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had at its disposal the more-seasoned British accountants compared to US counterparts 
who were trained in the key areas of corporate finance such as mergers, valuations and 
auditing.
405
 Accounting established further trust for multinationals through creating 
standardized rules to oversee a company, even if they were not a part of the internal 
management team.406 Stockholders had imperfect information on operations of a 
company, the House of Morgan’s regular use of company audits. In addition, releasing 
financial statements was groundbreaking and helped lead to major growth in the industry 
around the 20th century, which was essential for continued expansion of the 
multinationals in attracting outside investors—and in the process further separating 
ownership from management. 
 
Separation of Ownership from Management 
The large-scale multinationals’ acquiring competitors and setting up international 
operations fostered another change in business, namely the separation of owners and 
management.407 The trend would only accelerate into the early 20th century.408 Morgan 
played a leading role in the process of separating owners from management through the 
sale of securities via syndicates. Doing so brought a major shift from family-owned and 
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run firms that had dominated years before.409 Instead of the founders running the 
operations, management would be conducted by a hierarchy of paid executives in focused 
segments of the company overseeing specialized workers.410 However, new problems 
arose from the separation of owners and management, as corporate managers and 
investors had different objectives from just maximizing profits.411 
The House of Morgan helped alleviate the principal-agent problem by being in 
positions of power in the firms it represented being on its board. Through board 
representation, Morgan’s partners were in a position to achieve the most important role of 
a director overseeing enterprises through continuous management assessment and the 
business operating to serve the shareholders and bondholders.412 Following 
reorganization or a merger, the extent of the financier’s power was the greatest on the 
board as uncertainty among stockholders was higher given new direction and high debts. 
It is also important to note that many of the acquisitions that occurred were among former 
fierce rivals in a given industry, thus having a team of rivals serving as management with 
the bankers performing as internal arbitrators for the many disputes.413 The Morgan 
partners were trusted, based on high character and decades of honorable dealing, and 
were well suited for their role. However, they commanded and received near total control 
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when involved in the first few years and were very hands-on with all aspects of 
operations.414 
Having a Morgan partner on a board was not just for a show but also for giving up 
substantial control over major executive appointments to the ability of raising funds.415 
Having a few Morgan partners and allies on a board could give effective control of the 
company to their investors interests since the majority of shareholders are not present or 
proxy their votes to financial firms. So unlike previous family-run small business, where 
trust in the personal character and its ties with the merchant bank were enough, with tens 
of thousands of workers more oversight was demanded. Morgan and its peers desired 
board representation, committee positions, and being the trustee in order to safeguard its 
client’s interest and its own representations. Trust was now being institutionalized by 
building hierarchies on top of layers of rules and standardized reporting in turn producing 
many of the largest companies.416 
Morgan’s partners were on the boards of the leading companies spread throughout 
the economy. Railroad expert Charles Coster was on an astonishing 59 corporate boards 
during his career, including leading US rails and industrials like General Electric.417 
Morgan’s partners had board member representation on a range of leading organizations, 
including leading US rails such as New York Central, Northern Pacific and Erie Railroad. 
The board of the world’s largest publicly traded company, US Steel, was dominated by 
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Morgan partners and other leading companies such as AT&T Co., International 
Harvester, and General Electric. The Morgan-influenced board’s helped direct the 
strategies of its underlying companies, including acquiring new diverse product lines. 
 
Large Capital-Intensive Multiunit Organizations 
Prices had been going down in a range of industries, and manufacturers formed 
consolidations to escape the severe price competition that developed during the 
depression in the mid-1890s in certain types of industries: capital-intensive organization 
with high fixed costs and loaded with debt. The Herbert Spencer’s survival-of-the-fittest 
approach to doing business, of trying to defeat one’s competition, was losing defenders it 
had among those who distributed capital. Cooperation for sustainable long-term profits 
and development became the desired approach among the bankers in control of corporate 
boards and leading executives.418 Full-scale merger across the industry landscape was 
deemed to be the answer in contrast to temporary measures such as joint ventures or 
cartels for longer-run sustainability contrary to short-term fix to deal with continually 
falling prices, intense competition, and lackluster profits. Following the major 
consolidation wave at the turn of the 20th century, large corporations could more 
effectively control production for their industry and enforce price maintenance in a more 
profitable matter.419 
Around the turn of the 20th century, a tidal wave of merger activity swept through 
the U.S. with 1,800 companies being consolidated into just 93 by1904 over a ten-year 
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period.420 The rapid consolidation led to many new oligopolies and monopolies within 
these industries as 80% of these companies controlled at least 40% of their respective 
market share within their industry, and nearly half of those controlled over 70% market 
share for their industry.421 Large multiunit institutions was the dominant force in 
organizing economic assets now, which was increasingly being concentrated. This may 
be seen by looking at the size of the largest 100 companies in the US by 1904 which 
comprised 40% of the industry capital and had quadrupled in size given all the 
consolidation over the past ten years.422 By 1912, these colossal corporations dominated 
not only the American landscape but globally as well. Eight of the top ten companies in 
the world based on market capitalization presided in the US, with 54 of the largest 100; 
Britain was next in line with just 15.423 At the center of the consolidation wave was the 
House of Morgan, which fostered cooperation among competitors, financial syndicates, 
suppliers and customers to merge into large-scale multinational corporations and 
accounted for over 50% of mergers based on market capitalization during the great 
consolidation wave.424 The House of Morgan’s central role in the first wave of 
consolidations would continue in years thereafter as again the leader in mergers and 
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acquisition activity—between 1902 and 1912 issued $1.95 billion based on market 
capitalization.425 
Following the great consolidation movement, the new dominant form of business 
was the large multiunit corporation.426 Product differentiation was another way to deal 
with price declines and acquisition offered a quick solution to product diversification in 
contrast to development organically.427 Horizontal consolidation of the industry was the 
preferred method of choice in merging whole industries into massive enterprises.428 
However, in certain industries a combination of acquiring not only key competitors, but 
also suppliers and customers was promoted via vertical integration to provide greater 
industry stability, reduce future competition, increase control over inputs and have a 
ready market to sell products into.429 The result was that the largest companies now had 
multiple operations and subsidiaries as a part of their organization structure. 
These new large multiunit corporations were capital-intensive, which was 
apparent in the overall statistics and made them very dependent on the most mandarin of 
private banks like the House of Morgan. By 1900, $19,200 was invested on average per 
manufacturing plant with a capital-output ratio for the manufacturing sector of 0.75— 
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representing a 75% and 44% increase respectively compared with 1880.430  As business 
increasingly became larger, a greater need for capital was required from external sources. 
The meeting of that need was facilitated and organized by merchant bankers like the 
House of Morgan, which was at the center of capital markets with unmatched resources 
thanks to its cooperative industry structure, interlocking boards and being major 
stockholders of leading corporate institutions.431 At the turn of the 20th century, firms 
were highly dependent on scarce capital that was concentrated in a narrow group; if a 
company had a crucial undertaking without their support, the project or acquisition was 
not going to get started. Significant investment for corporate expansion, acquisitions, and 
investment was controlled by a small group of financiers whose approval was necessary 
for the project, industry, or company.432 The reason for this power and control was that 
the interlinked nature of the financial syndicate meant that only a few private bankers 
were making the decisions for large-scale funding needs.433 These same decision makers 
were also promoting longer term profitability through sustained innovation within the 
corporation. 
 
Research and Development 
Peter Drucker who was one the preeminent 20th-century authorities on 
management and corporate organizations, pithily states the purpose of business was all 
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about marketing and innovation.434 Research and development, likewise, became 
increasingly a part of these giant organizations desires to institutionalize innovation.435 
Similar to capital expenditures and acquiring competitors, research and development 
required meaningful funds as a way to further offset steep costs from higher skilled 
workers.436 A focus on developing leading-edge technologies has been consistently seen 
throughout the US business history, with the House of Morgan at the forefront. This was 
evident through its continued support of the United States’ most prolific innovator in the 
19th century, Thomas Edison, to innovation within the US rails. For example, the House 
of Morgan organized the largest US railroad company—Pennsylvania Railroad—and in 
1876 became the first American company to hire a Ph.D. chemist,437 with innovation seen 
by the company in ensuing decades such as testing locomotives at the highest speeds to 
developing track in difficult terrain such as under the Hudson River. 
While improving existing products was important, a greater increase ultimately in 
production comes from new services or products for companies.438 Following the merger 
and acquisition wave discussed earlier at the turn of the 20th century, companies had far 
more products under their corporate umbrella to worry about with expiring patents 
opening up potential new competition and were increasingly developing systematic ways 
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to promote innovation.439 Prior to 1900, science and industry were largely divorced, with 
the vast majority of scientists’ careers as teachers in universities.440 Developing research 
and development centers was one way to organize sustainable innovation. By combining 
scientists guided by practical applications to produce real-world products, with Morgan’s 
organized General Electric, the first large US company to do so.441 Strong innovation 
gave a formidable advantage in expanding overseas with competitors lacking in the 
advanced technologies. 
 
Global Operations 
Another hallmark of large companies at the turn of the 20th century was an 
enlarged focus on going global to diversify its markets with a new consumer base. The 
US manufacturing of exports surged starting around 1895, rising from a $205 million to 
$485 million by 1900, with a corresponding rise in its overall share of US exports from 
26% to 35%—similar escalation was seen from 1908 to 1913, which boosted 
manufacturing’s total export share in the US to nearly 50%.442 Merchant bankers were 
integral to the nature of trade, which was wholly dependent on the role merchant bankers 
played as trusted middlemen, which lent their clients their firm’s name and credit.443 
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While overseas expansion for trade was surging and had few government hurdles 
to overtake, “liability of foreignness” was still high.444 To reduce their risk, businessmen 
followed a policy gradually laying a stake in a different land. The process can best be 
described as an incremental move that progressed from least risk and commitment on 
upwards as the multinational became acclimated with the environment, gained increased 
knowledge, and developed further avenues for overseas sales. The progression typically 
starts with exporting, finding an agent to sell and a distribution company created to 
establish local manufacture for production.445 
The House of Morgan was a leading firm in enabling the incremental strategy 
implemented by the multinationals given its large capital reserves, unmatched global 
connections and pristine name which ensured confidence for all parties involved. 
Utilizing bill of exchange and commercial letter of credit the House of Morgan used its 
outstanding reputation and financial credit in providing diverse services, including 
facilitating international trade to supplying credit while dealing with a wide array of laws, 
and different cultures as well as handling assorted currencies.446 Going transoceanic was 
essential for US multinationals given the rapid production needed to find larger markets; 
it increasingly made economic sense to have investments overseas as well once 
established avenues of trade were in place.447 Another key resource merchant bankers 
provided for companies was the financial capital to expand internationally and facilitate 
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the largest form of multinational investment via acquisitions.448 US investment overseas 
by the time of World War I was a significant part of large corporations’ spending and 
overall US economy.449 
Multinational corporations would choose locations that were geographically close 
by, such as Mexico and Canada, which would ease setting up costs for new operations. 
Companies would also choose locations where they had had significant trading already 
taking place, like London, with a wealthy consumer base and US largest trading partner, 
to set up new operations.450 The largest fiscal agent for London in the US was the House 
of Morgan, which had a rich history of servicing US companies in London right back to 
its founding under George Peabody.451 The trend to start overseas operations in London 
accelerated at the turn of the 20th century across disparate industries.452 While expanding 
to service London consumers provided new outlets, best practices used in some of the 
organizations in the British Empire were brought back to the US including corporate 
welfare. 
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Corporate Incentives & Welfare 
The rapidly expanding large-cap multinationals had an equal surge in the number 
of employees a firm would have, which were increasingly concentrated in larger 
concerns. In 1860, there were 1.3 million employees in US manufacturing, doubling to 
over 2.7 million by 1900 and by 1909 nearly 2/3 of all wage earners were employed with 
at least 100 employees.453 With the startling increase in size and scope of these firms, 
business philanthropy was used both for defensive and offensive reasons for 
multinationals to address employee relations. This included support for workers in order 
to prevent unions coming in the workplace to government involvement like in Europe 
and also to encourage a more loyal workforce of company men. Corporate welfare 
programs in the US were targeted for immediate needs.454 There were different types of 
programs companies offered to support their workers who were often paternalistic to give 
the perception of a large family.455 Other plans adopted included company houses, 
diverse types of employment plans such as insurance and more innovative offerings such 
as stock purchases.456 The type of incentives a company offered was also effectively used 
for public relations to give off a certain image or help take the focus off negative news. 
The House of Morgan was an early pioneer in 1907 adopting an advertising 
campaign not at direct sales but as public relations to promote American Telephone & 
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Telegraph as a beneficial monopoly for the consumer through persuasive ads developed 
by an ad agency that ran for decades.457 The firm was also ground breaking in developing 
a corporate stock option program at US Steel, employee training at GE and welfare for 
employees at International Harvester. The trends and publicity by these titans of industry 
spread and were becoming increasingly a part of business—by 1914, 2,500 US large-caps 
had some form of the benefit program.458 As I shall go over in the case studies section of 
this report, the House of Morgan was instrumental in the growth of employment welfare 
and incentive programs, which were also used for public relations such as US Steel, 
International Harvester, and General Electric. 
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Chapter VI 
Case Studies: Large-Cap US Multinationals 
 
The organization and strategy on which the four companies focused in the case 
study review showed a clear Morgan-led preference for cooperation over competition. US 
Steel, International Harvester, General Electric, and International Mercantile Marine 
Company were all formed through large-scale mergers with its key competitors. To 
reduce the tension between the team of rivals and serve the shareowner base the Morgan 
partners were given control of the companies, which was reflected in selecting leaders 
who could best cooperate within a broader community of interest for sustainable profits. 
This was fostered by US Steel’s Judge Gary’s having regular dinners with the leaders in 
the steel industry’s maintaining stability in the industry, while GE and their lead 
competitors both nearby and abroad set up arrangements to protect their local markets. In 
US Steel, International Harvester, and General Electric proposals to support the 
community of interests were utilized and reflected with increased corporate welfare and 
employee incentive programs. International Mercantile Marine highlights that not in all 
cases did the House of Morgan build a successful multinational. Morgan’s partners’ 
intention to get involved in the deal to support a broader community of interest to bring 
about a more stable and lower cost transportation for its manufacturing and rail concerns 
backfired on anticipated gains for shareholders. This is despite having control of the 
board, selecting the management team and developing the strategy post merger as in its 
successful acquisitions. 
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US Steel 
At the turn of the 20th century, the United States economy was benefiting from 
robust trade, being a net exporter of manufactured goods driven by an upswing in 
production. Manufacturing goods surged from 20% of US exports in 1890 to 35% by 
1900 and nearly 50% in 1913.459 The chief driver of the manufacturing success was the 
steel industry, where the US had been the world’s largest producer since 1890 and was 
the leading category of manufactured exports by 1913.460 The dominant firm at the time 
was founded by a successful businessman originating from the rail industry, Andrew 
Carnegie. Carnegie Steel Company had the largest volume share of production driven by 
leading technology edge and superior organizational efficiencies.461 J.P. Morgan and 
Andrew Carnegie’s relationship went back many years, where they met crossing the 
Atlantic together in 1868. Carnegie did business with London’s Morgan arm for a St. 
Louis bridge deal offering in 1870 and later raised money for his first steel mill.462 
The merger movement in the steel industry had started the decade before the US 
Steel merger, with Morgan’s partners the main orchestrators.463 Within steel, Morgan had 
a desire to protect its clients, Federal Steel and National Tube, from increased 
competition with a more permanent industry solution.464 The House of Morgan’s 
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involvement in promoting US Steel was to serve its steel clients’ interest but also, more 
importantly bring order to an industry that was vitally important to the rest of the 
economy and sectors, including the rails—where they had the leading representation as 
well. 
The formal start of US Steel creation began at a social club dinner event in the 
University Club in New York in December 1900, highlighting the importance of posh 
clubs in generating business. The dinner had roughly 80 of the most powerful 
businessmen, including August Belmont, Jacob Schiff, James Stillman, and J.P. Morgan 
listening to Carnegie Steel Corporation’s president Charles Schwab, who started 
immediately discussing consolidating the industry post his speech.465 The last key step 
was getting the principal owner Carnegie’s approval, which also started at a private social 
setting, Saint Andrews Golf Club in Westchester.466 Trust underpinned the entire process; 
in fact, there was no formal contract signed initially.467 Social events would remain an 
important staple of US Steel business operations’ going forward, as illustrated by “Gary 
dinners” hosted at the Waldorf Astoria, named after its chairmen, with leading steel men 
of over one hundred to discuss cooperation and stability within the industry.468 
A key aspect of coming up with the valuation for US Steel, still used to this day, 
was based on earnings prospects, with approximately $40 million a year with price 
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coming in at 12 times earnings.469 The size of the newly formed US Steel at $1.4 billion 
simply staggering the world’s largest corporation represented about 7% of total US GDP 
at the time.470 To place the deal, the House of Morgan as sole manager would lead a 
global syndicate of 300, which given its long history of success and strong management 
over syndicates ensured its success.471 Like many of Morgan’s and his peers’ mergers, 
New Jersey was chosen as the official location on April 1, 1901 for the United States 
Steel Corporation.472 Its first-year running would show the extent of the operation, 
producing a staggering 2/3 of the entire nation’s steel output.473 
A key to understanding mergers conducted by the House of Morgan was its 
control throughout and post-merger process. Ranging from valuing the assets, leading the 
syndicate to distributing securities, naming the board, setting the objectives and 
approving the management was entirely a Morgan operation. Morgan selected the 
original board for US Steel, with more non-steel members, including three partners from 
Morgan’s firm.474 Years after the merger, the control would continue with the board’s 
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being selected by Morgan’s partners.475 For its successful work a large payout awaited, 
posting net profit of $11.5 million on the US Steel deal.476 
Following the merger, as was typical of other multinational corporations formed, 
the House of Morgan would continue to represent US Steel as fiscal agent and a 
depositary of the corporation.477 It would continue to help bring in needed finance for 
steel operation’s long-term capital, upgrading plants and future acquisitions.478 Given US 
Steel’s global operations, the House of Morgan’s London arm proved very beneficial, 
with the company having large deposit balance and its European exports handled by 
Morgan’s British partners.479 There was a strong appetite for US Steel shares 
internationally since the merger, which continued in advance of World War I, with nearly 
$150 million of corporate securities held outside the US.480 Besides serving the 
corporation’s needs for acquisitions and internal improvements, it would also cater to its 
subsidiaries, with issuances in tens of millions of dollars.481 
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The House of Morgan was not just influential externally to the multinational, but 
was deeply immersed in company operations and held key roles post-merger a decade 
later still dominating the board.482 Morgan and its partners had a very different 
philosophy of how to run a business compared with Carnegie’s original men like Charles 
Schwab, namely preferring to cooperate with competitors in contrast to trying to defeat 
them for market share. US Steel’s approach named a fixed open price in a cooperative 
matter with competitors that while losing market share for the company stabilized 
conditions in the steel industry.483 After a lackluster start over the first three years,484 and 
importantly, different views on how the company should run with Morgan’s men, Charles 
Schwab had a short tenure at the top. Replaced by Judge Gary—served as chairmen for 
26 years until his death485—who was well-known to Morgan since his leading of 
Federated Steel and was very much a staunch supporter of Morgan’s desire for 
cooperation within the industry contrary to cut throat competition.486 The new president 
Judge Gary firmly advocated cooperation as the guiding policy concerning a community 
of shared interests of all steel producers in order to maintain reasonable and steady 
prices.487 The House of Morgan’s merger not only brought about stability within the 
industry488 but was a success for shareholders as well. From the time of inception in 1901 
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until 1913 an initial investment in US Steel’s common stock total return of 150% 
significantly outperformed a benchmark composite of steel firms whose return was only 
50% and the broader stock market as well.489 
One of the lasting impacts of US Steel was in regard to employee relations and 
promotion of a positive perception within the broader public through corporate 
philanthropy.490 In regard to labor relations and employee incentives, Morgan’s partner 
Perkins designed US Steel’s plan of any employee being able to purchase preferred stock 
of the company using an installment plan at a special price, which was unheard of at the 
time.491 Other financial incentives utilized by US Steel and designed by Morgan’s men 
included giving managers a bonus based on the total profits of the company, vested over 
multiple years, designed to increase long-term loyalty to firm and lower employee 
turnover.492 
A favorable public image from the start was a goal of US Steel’s being the 
world’s first billion-dollar company with increased scrutiny paid to the company.!
Corporate welfare programs would be a big part of US Steel’s overall strategy, 
approaching $10 million annually on the welfare programs.493 From the start, it was 
Morgan’s men such as George Perkins, who pushed for employment welfare programs. A 
“good trust” in contrast to the typical trust perception was the viewpoint the firm strived 
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to maintain especially with politicians through plans such as an employee stock-sharing 
plan. In line with a favorable image, was fiscal transparency from the start. This had been 
a tactic of Morgan represented companies, including Federal Steel, that US Steel built 
upon. The firm in September 1901 was the first large cap company to issue quarterly 
financial statements and operating report gaining positive publicity.494 Another large 
organization formed by the House of Morgan continued with the best practices from US 
Steel including greater financial transparency was International Harvester. 
 
International Harvester 
Since the founding of the US, farming was an integral business and key to the 
nation’s success. While by the turn of the 20th century the number of farmers had been in 
constant decline relative to total population, it still represented the leading area of 
employment and major exporter in the US, with new technology gains welcomed by 
farmers. Given cost per acre was relatively modest and that labor was expensive 
encouraged the farmers in the US to spend large sums on farm machinery.495 The longest 
running farm equipment producers were based in Chicago. McCormick was the oldest 
and largest within the farming manufacturing space, with production starting in 1842. In 
fact, in 1851, George Peabody, founder of the Morgan’s London branch, had helped 
display Cyrus McCormick’s reaper in an international exhibition of industrial products at 
the Crystal Palace, where during six months over six million people visited.496 Another 
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large industry competitor that was family owned was the Deerings, which was the second 
largest producer of harvesting machines.497 
As in other major industries throughout the US price wars were commonplace in 
the industry.498 A move towards consolidation began to reign in competition and thus 
boost profits.499 Throughout the 1890s several attempts at consolidation occurred, but a 
consistent problem was the bitter rivals between the McCormicks and Deerings that did 
not want the other concern controlling the interest.500 Upon conferring with the leading 
corporation lawyer in New York, Francis Lynde Stetson—who also happened to be J.P. 
Morgan’s primary lawyer—McCormicks and Deerings decided to turn to the House of 
Morgan to organize the consolidation as trusted middlemen, thus preventing either party 
from control.501 
The formation of the new company would be entirely led by the House of Morgan 
from management selection to picking the right board; which was essential among the 
bitter rivals.502 Similar with other mergers, Morgan was quick to organize once it had 
formally begun, and chose New Jersey as the home given favorable corporate laws.503 
The company was more conservatively valued from previous deals given fears about 
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backlash from farmers.504 In 1902, five firms combined to create International Harvester 
Company, which accounted for 80% to 90% of production of major harvesting machinery 
segments in the United States.505 
The primary way the House of Morgan controlled the firm was through the board 
of directors and as one of three trustees, with all directors selected by Morgan’s partner 
George Perkins.506 Perkins was also one of the three trustees and chairmen of the 
powerful Finance Committee and quickly put management in place that supported 
Morgan’s vision.507 Under the terms of the merger agreement of International Harvester, 
total discretion was given to Perkins, who would decide all organizational questions, with 
McCormick’s and Deering’s factions not in the position to bring about meaningful 
change.508 The founding family members by 1906 who remained following the initial 
formation would all be replaced by salaried professionals chosen by Morgan’s men.509 
Consistent with other Morgan operations, improving the fiscal operations was a primary 
focus, with solid results shown as evident by the declining ratio of selling expense to 
revenues—from 36% in 1899 pre-merger for McCormick’s Company to 21% on average 
from 1908 to 1911.510 Furthermore, another Morgan trademark was corporate 
transparency for the companies it represented, highlighted by a letter from George 
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Perkins to the then President Theodore Roosevelt boasting of the amount of information 
made available.511 The House of Morgan would also remain fiscal agent for International 
Harvester following the merger and aid in rising of additional securities valued in tens of 
millions of dollars.512 
International Harvester highlights that the core of Morgan’s operations for 
supporting overseas trade and banking needs was a good starting point to bring on future 
involvement with developing multinationals.513 The House of Morgan would play an 
integral role in the International Harvester’s overseas operations in non-financial manners 
such as registering McCormick’s patents in Britain, New Zealand, and Australia and 
helping to arrange corporate displays of farm equipment at farm machinery shows.514 
Multinational’s expansion often developed given change in laws, including anti-trust and 
tariff legislation. Owing in part to the possibility of increasing tariffs and being closer to 
foreign clientele, International Harvester in 1911 had five foreign plants located in 
Canada, Sweden, France, Germany, and Russia. By 1911, the firm had 40% of sales 
coming from overseas, which were of higher profit margins compared with domestic US 
sales.515 
Russia, in particular, demonstrates how the House of Morgan aids a company to 
expand overseas. International Harvester’s most important foreign market since 1905 was 
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Russia given its large agrarian society that was increasingly relying on higher tech 
manufacturing solutions.516 International Harvester was looking into setting  up 
operations in Russia given increased fears surrounding a tariff.517 It is important to note 
that George Perkins, was also a leader in New York Life Insurance—one of the most 
successful American ventures in Russia for the years 1895-1914.518 Given Perkins’ long 
track record of doing business in Russia, he had established connections at the highest 
positions and were on to how best to develop Russian operations further for International 
Harvester.519 It is telling to note that the US State Department representative was not a 
real option given lack of information around tariff issues—with the House of Morgan in a 
better position to consult.520 The House of Morgan’s support of International Harvester in 
Russia also showcased the relationship it had with the State Department and how it could 
gain extra leverage to support Morgan’s client goals through its leading role in Dollar 
Diplomacy. The US State Department utilized Morgan’s operations for various 
enterprises in Central America and China, and hence had its own reasons for wanting to 
satisfy George Perkins with Russia if called upon.521 American firms came to dominate 
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the market, and International Harvester would retain its leading market share in Russia at 
roughly 90%.522 
The House of Morgan would again support corporate welfare programs and 
incentive-based initiatives in a cooperative approach to appease the various communities’ 
interests the firm held. George Perkins’ goal for International Harvester was to be shown 
as the “good trust” via corporate welfare programs built on the model they had followed 
at US Steel aimed at building trust among stockholders.523 For its increasing women 
workforce, International Harvester launched ladies friendly dressing rooms complete with 
mirrors, and group entertainment was brought in during the day such as staging an 
operetta.524 Proposals were also aimed at supporting the experience of male workers such 
as having a men’s club, which gained strong media attention. George Perkins  was an 
advocate of International Harvester’s showcasing corporate welfare programs to other 
companies at fairs, expositions, and news articles with the intention that similar measures 
be adopted and likewise to get positive public relations for the company.525 Other plans to 
support workers included incentive plans with the pension plan (1908) and profit-sharing 
plans (1909) developed by Perkins.526 It is important to note that the House of Morgan 
viewed corporate welfare programs as an extension of its core business, and not charity, 
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which promoted a positive persona of the corporation, as illustrated further with General 
Electric.527 
 
General Electric 
Electricity has been studied for many centuries, but its commercial utilization 
would occur in the 19th century, including its application to communications, heating, 
and lighting.528 The story of General Electric’s founding is intricately tied to electricity 
and one of history’s greatest inventors. Thomas Edison had an astounding 1,092 patents 
during his illustrious career, with notable work, including phonograph, stock ticker, 
telegraph, telephone.529 Thomas Edison would play a leading role in the lighting 
industry’s formation as the primary inventor of the electric public utility still used 
today.530 It has been said that one of Edison’s chief assets has been his long relationship 
with the House of Morgan given the additional diligence attached to pleasing the bankers 
and significant financial support.531 
Edison turned to the House of Morgan to organize his new company and promote 
his products abroad. Morgan’s partners effectively leveraged world fairs to gain attention, 
as in the Paris Electrical Exposition in 1881 and Crystal Palace Fair shortly thereafter 
leading to Edison’s lights being used in the entrance of the prestigious Paris Opera house, 
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development of the electric street car system in the US, and building a power station in 
London’s Holborn Viaduct.532 The House of Morgan would not only help display 
Edison’s products but also financially back his new company, serve as the primary 
banker in both New York and London, and organize Edison Electric Light Company in 
1882 merging the following year with its chief rival.533 J.P. Morgan personally was the 
first to test out Edison’s product in his home in 1882.534 Mergers and acquisitions would 
remain prevalent in the coming years, largely planned by Morgan’s partner Charles 
Coster.535 The firm would further expand in the subsequent years under Morgan’s 
guidance, leveraging international syndicates such as with Deutsche Bank and 
incorporating in New Jersey, a hallmark for the time.536 
The General Electric Company (GE) would again be fostered through a Morgan 
lead merger in 1892 of one of its principal competitors Thomson-Houston Electric, and 
the newly formed entity which had over two-time sales of its chief electric rival 
Westinghouse.537 The driving force behind the creation of the multinational corporation 
for GE was to stabilize the industry and improve efficiency within the company. To 
accomplish the task, the firm sought to stabilize the industry’s pricing, reduce production 
costs, facilitate the exchange of patents, and improve overall management practices.538 
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Similar to its other mergers, the House of Morgan would control the board and select the 
management. Morgan’s partners dominated the board following the formation of GE 
represented by Morgan’s partner Charles Coster and J.P. Morgan himself taking an active 
role, including asking Henry Villard to resign in favor of Morgan’s selected choice.539 
The newly formed venture hit problems during the panic of 1893 given the weak 
financial base of the former Thomson-Houston Electric Company, and Morgan and its 
syndicate partner would financially save the company, given in part its moral 
responsibility to investors.540 The company prospects rebounded; bolstering over 10,000 
customers spread around the world and operating distinct divisions ranging from mining, 
to rails to electric power equipment.541 Central to GE success was a strategy around 
continuous innovation, something for which the House of Morgan aided in getting patent 
approval in different overseas locations.542 
GE would demonstrate the preferred Morgan strategy of cooperation in contrast to 
trying to defeat one’s competition, which was showcased within the electric lamp market. 
By dividing away the world markets with major competitors with international 
agreements, GE could focus on dominating the US market, which it did through 
cooperation with competitors. This was accomplished by 1905 with signing pacts with 
overseas firms where GE held equity in those such as British Thomson-Houson, 
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Compagnie Francaise Thomson- Houston, Tokyo Electric Company, Allgemeine 
Elektrizitats- Gesellschaft (AEG), and Canadian General Electric with contracts in 
exclusive territories with GE always retaining the lucrative US market.543 For example, 
GE and Westinghouse Company dominated the American electrical industry with 
combined 75% market share in 1896. That same year, the firms agreed to share all 
patents via licenses that would put the value of production significantly in GE’s favor 
(5:3 ratio), with both companies agreeing to pay a hefty royalty if they exceeded the ratio 
and would completely exclude all patents related to electric lighting.544 In effect, GE 
could broker institutionalized market share over its chief competitor for years to come or 
implement an often-used Morgan strategy of interlocking company’s ownership to have 
greater leverage of the industry. This was seen with the development of the National 
Electric Lamp Company in the early 20th century. GE owned three-quarters of the 
common stock of National Electric Lamp Company with most of the independent 
manufacturers being bought out by National Electric, which gave the appearance that 
these acquisitions remained autonomous of GE when in actuality, they were completely 
controlled.545 GE dominated the highly profitable industry for decades to come. 
At the turn of the 20th century GE would continue to acquire new companies in 
order to grow and raised external financing from the House of Morgan to do so, such as 
with Sprague Electric in 1902.546 Additional funds were raised also to support internal 
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operations and bolster a strong balance sheet, consistent with other firms Morgan 
represented.547 Operationally, GE continued to showcase good budgetary management in 
other ways—for example, reducing account receivables from 38% in 1905 to just 13% 
roughly twenty years later.548 GE would remain a fiscally conservative firm, especially 
compared with its competitions, which was highlighted by the fact that the Westinghouse 
Company eventually was forced into a receivership while GE, given its relative fiscal 
conservatism avoided such issues.549 GE was also a very shareholder-friendly firm, 
paying out $97 billion in dividends from 1897 to 2000 (inflation adjusted in 2000 
dollars).550 
GE would be a forerunner on what would be a growing trend in other larger 
companies, the education of workers given the need for skillful employees.551 Corporate 
schools were also good for PR purposes and in-line with a Progressive Era business 
focused on perception of being paternal to its workers.552 Consistent with corporate 
education was their apprentice program started in 1901, which provided specialized 
training overall applicable to GE.553 Young executives next entered a rotation program 
through various parts of GE for one/two years to get hands-on training and see how the 
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assorted parts of GE function and would be placed in one of the departments having 
gained a more holistic view of the company in contrast to spending one’s whole career in 
the same distinct group.554 Given the number of products and the global customer base, a 
diverse group of managers was trained and specialized in specific areas, effectively aided 
by the apprentice program, still used in many corporations today. GE’s apprentice 
training program was very effective in developing young employees into skilled positions 
and managers and was adopted throughout the firm.555 The apprentice training model 
quickly spread to other organizations as similar with Morgan’s other concerns, GE 
promoted its virtues in industry journals, and academic publications and was given a lot 
of weight by other executives to adopt similar corporate schools given GE’s leading 
industrial position.556 
The House of Morgan had promoted its enterprises to be the respective leaders in 
innovating new technologies for its industry, for which GE became the standard for other 
large industrials to emulate. GE would take innovation one step further by being the first 
large-scale company to develop a research and development center.557 After its initial 
small-scale start, GE would quickly expand the operation under former MIT Professor 
Willis R Whitney’s guidance and provide a hybrid laboratory that was, on the one hand, 
research based with scientific freedom and on the other guided by real-world 
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application.558 For GE, its business required it to be at the leading edge of technology for 
its business lines, which it could do through acquisitions or research and development.559 
Many of the best practices from General Electric were implemented in other Morgan 
organized companies, such as International Mercantile Marine, but in this particular case 
a very different long term outcome. 
 
International Mercantile Marine 
While the House of Morgan had incredible success in the majority of its business 
ventures, it did not have the Midas touch with all its deals. This was readily evident with 
the formation of the world’s largest private merchant marine—the International 
Mercantile Marine Company formalized fully in October 1902. The company was not 
only far from a success for its shareholders but an unmitigated failure with the common 
stock having an annualized decline of -25% over the time of its formation to the start of 
World War 1.560 The losses for the company were not just financial, but it had the 
greatest private maritime loss for the time with the world’s biggest ship the Titanic’s 
tragic sinking with the loss of over 1,600 lives, the news having been kept on the front 
page of both US and British papers for some time after.561 By the spring of 1915, the 
difficult results were shown by International Mercantile Marine Company’s entering 
foreclosure proceedings following missing interest payments on its outstanding bonds for 
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six months.562 The multi-million dollar profit expected for the House of Morgan was the 
polar opposite—with a loss estimated over a million dollars—which also tied-up the 
partner’s funds and slightly damaged the invincible mystique of the world’s premiere 
merchant bank.563 Given its history of success before and after, what went wrong with the 
House of Morgan’s formation? 
To understand why the formation went so wrong, it is helpful to get a background 
of the shipping industry before the merger. Ocean-bound trade experienced steady growth 
since the founding of the American Republic.564 American-made ships initially 
dominated US trade given ample supply of wood for ships; by the 1830s the US had 90% 
of international trade under its flag.565 The shipping industry was encouraged to expand 
politically given strategic importance of the high seas as well as being given support by 
the largest sector of the economy. Railroad executives in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania 
Railroad) and Baltimore (Baltimore & Ohio) had for years been active in the shipbuilding 
industry to encourage an increase in overseas trade with Europe by having a port for their 
respective railroad lines.566 Shipping is a highly elastic business which fluctuated with 
international trade and having to compete with global operators, especially with the 
world’s navel superpower in London.567 With the advent of steam shipping, a dramatic 
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shift occurred with the US only having 10% of US foreign trade under US ships given the 
near 30% cost advantage British shipbuilders offered compared versus American 
counterparts by the turn of the 20th century.568 
An increase focus on promoting a US transatlantic shipping corporation in the US 
was gathering steam given Americans were not getting their perceived fair share of trade 
and rapidly rising prices following the panic during the mid 1890s. Several events 
contributed to the push, including the outbreak of the China-Japanese War (1894-1895), 
Greco-Turkish War (1897), Spanish-American War (1898), and the Boer War (1899-
1902), which took normally merchant going ships in the North Atlantic into military 
conflict and increased demand for supplies for these various wars such as grain which 
further increased the demand for shipping.569 For example, the British Empire by the end 
of 1900 had withdrawn roughly 2 million tons of shipping, which was nearly equal to its 
next European rival Germany’s total tonnage and double France’s.570 On the Pacific, 
ships were further deterred to handle the Klondike and Nome Alaska gold rush.571 
Factoring that global trade had become buoyant and these aforementioned events 
highlighted to American businessmen the vulnerability of their overseas trade that given 
such high dependence on foreign nations for shipbuilding could materially impact 
business trade.572 The most preeminent leaders in navel studies such as Alfred T. Mahan 
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to presidents such as William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, advocated for stronger 
and expanded merchant marine.573 Morgan-dominated industries such as steel wanted a 
more consolidated shipping industry to have more stabilized and predictable industry for 
international trade. Morgan-controlled railroad executives’ vision was essentially to 
extend rail tracks across the North Atlantic and better align shipping to train schedules, 
thereby increasing efficiency and lowering cost.574 
By the turn of the 20th century, North Atlantic trade and passenger movement 
were the largest in the world for shipping, with British, German, and US companies 
looking to have a large-scale consolidation.575 The leading advocates for an American 
transatlantic shipping corporation included the top shipbuilders such as the head of the 
International Navigation Co. Clement Griscom based in Philadelphia boasting three 
decades in shipping and Bernard N. Baker of Baltimore’s Atlantic Transport Company.576 
New York Harbor at this time dominated all Atlantic trade in the US, having the larger 
tonnage versus the entire American east coast combined and relied on foreign built 
ships.577 The British Empire was the principal supplier given its roughly 30% cost 
advantage to American competitors.578 The American shipbuilders, unlike their British 
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counterparts, struggled including Griscom’s company’s not being able to pay for 
dividends and pushing for increased subsidies from the US Government.579 
Despite some serious reservations about the shipbuilding industry, ultimately the 
House of Morgan drove the consolidation of the shipping.580 As with other mergers, the 
firm had previous relationships with the key companies involved, including helping the 
International Navigation Company raise $13 million in mortgage bonds during 1899.581 
The combination was unique in its global nature, through the combination of four of the 
preeminent British and US shipping lines: International Navigation Company, Atlantic 
Transport Company, Frederick Leyland & Company, Oceanic Steam Navigation 
Company, plus traffic agreements with two of the leading German carriers over the 
ensuing decade, Hamburg-America Line and North German Lloyd.582 The deal was 
enormous at a total of $170 million, broken out by $50 million in bonds, $60 million in 
preferred stock, and $60 million in common.583 International Mercantile Marine was 
essentially a merger of British shipping lines, with US-flagged ships only accounting for 
15% of its assets and the greatest private, foreign direct investment before World War 
I.584 The world’s largest shipping company controlled roughly 20% the non-tramp 
tonnage in the leading North Atlantic trade.585 
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In many ways, the deal was orchestrated as the previous aforementioned fruitful 
mergers the House of Morgan lead on. The firm used the same syndicate members, by 
and large, that they used in the prosperous US Steel deal.586 The firm was securely in 
control post the merger, boasting two of the five trustees positions and three of twelve 
board positions.587 The price, while high in certain respects had, in fact, a lower book 
value price paid compared to US Steel.588 Besides the consolidation, potential 
competition coming from Germany was neutralized for the coming decade given a profit-
sharing cartel agreement.589 The House of Morgan would appear to ensure stable traffic 
given control over American railroads and the US Steel Corporation.590 In fact, four 
board of directors from International Mercantile Marine were on the board of US Steel.591 
However, as cited, the deal was the House of Morgan’s biggest blemish during its 
history to date. There was no one reason why, but there were several key factors. The 
syndicate had a whole host of issues with the securities, even causing a delay given 
expected subsidy from the US Government never materialized, weak equity markets, and 
a cyclical downturn in shipping after formation—eventually the syndicate’s unloading the 
securities at a heavy discount and a loss.592 The House of Morgan, unlike other mergers 
mentioned in previous chapters, was very hesitant about getting into the deal fully, really 
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becoming committed when the economic turn against the industry and more cash was 
needed; they came to their client’s aid against their best intuition.593 Importantly, unlike 
many other large American consolidations, this was a foreign acquisition, with 
International Mercantile Marine lacking the supportive US tariff protection to give it a 
boost.594 
New competition was not dealt with effectively, as the British shipbuilders had 
built and launched tramp carriers which were unscheduled with no fix sailing dates and 
essentially just in-time carriers versus the large steam shippers with set schedules leaving 
port often with empty cargo space often.595 While trade continued to surge into World 
War I as predicated, it became progressively more lopsided with US’s reducing its 
dependence on the British Empire for finished goods, aided by tariffs, including the 
Dingley Tariff. The net result of the unbalanced flow of trade allowed tramp steamers 
from London the ability to have just-in-time shipping loading schedules and sail to most 
profitable ports, while International Mercantile Marine ships with fixed schedules 
increasingly had inadequate cargoes.596 In fact, the British would again take over the 
largest share of North Atlantic trade given its ability to be flexible with quick delivery 
time.597 
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The creation of International Mercantile Marine was done to serve not only the 
shareholder’s value, which it clearly did not, but as in all major Morgan-led mergers 
serve a large community of interest. Ultimately, one of Morgan’s chief goals was 
achieved just not by their design. While the just-in-time shipping from the British 
trampers significantly undercut International Mercantile Marine, it did lower prices and 
increase the flow of trade, which benefited the far larger interest of the rails and 
manufacturing exports such as steel. Despite the lackluster company results from 
International Mercantile Marine, the overall result of broader stability in global trade was 
consistent with the House of Morgan’s underlying philosophy of supporting a broader 
community of interest in promotion of a more stable society. 
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Chapter VII 
Conclusion 
 
Morgan’s partners and their preceding family members had cultivated cultural, 
financial, political, and social capital that was unmatched in the US as recognized leaders 
in the varying parts of the society. These various forms of capital helped develop the 
superstructure for the multinational to operate within and create the overarching 
framework of the company itself. The title of my report is How the House of Morgan 
Cooperated to Develop the Large-Cap US Multinational Corporation, 1895-1913. With 
an underlying British foundation, goal of preserving their shared rich tradition and strong 
interests across society; the House of Morgan cooperated among a community of varying 
interests to further develop the large-cap US multinational during 1895-1913. 
The Morgan partners were members of a privileged ruling class whose forbearers 
leading status went back centuries to the British Empire. The House of Morgan’s partners 
were hypostatic in nature, both wholly British but also proudly American. They took 
what they deemed as one of the finest traditions civilizations had ever seen and reformed 
it to fit the US society to continue it onward. The families of the House of Morgan built 
up some of the US most preeminent institutions prior to their advancement of the US 
large-cap multinational corporation. Morgan’s partners families were pivotal in the 
formation of the United States, from founding several states such as Connecticut and 
Massachusetts, having leading generals in fighting for Independence, to being founding 
fathers of the American Republic. Relations overseas was well maintained with the great 
powers such as the British Empire and France, given leading roles as ambassadors for the 
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US to family members having prominent roles overseas in areas ranging from the House 
of Lords to the Bank of England. The moral temperament of the nation was set in large 
measure through these same families, from starting the Great Awakening to fighting 
against the evils of slavery. Financially, US money matters were consistently directed in 
part by Morgan’s partners families’ directives’, from their roles as preeminent merchants 
and bankers to formulating the First and Second Central Bank in the United States. 
Education standards in the US were developed in large measure from the House of 
Morgan’s family’s founding Princeton, and Yale to being the leading benefactors of 
Harvard, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania. 
The House of Morgan’s partners continued their families’ rich history themselves 
around the turn of the 20th century given their leading positions and development across 
various areas of society. This can be seen across the spectrum in business, financial, 
philanthropic, and religious matters. Morgan’s partners were leading members of the 
Episcopalian Church—US based member of the Anglican community who was also 
focused on social justice to solve society’s broader issues. They formed what would be 
the predecessor of modern foundations, the Peabody Education Fund, to the operating of 
the first major transnational non-profit in the Red Cross. They were equally benefactors 
of high culture from developing leading social clubs to congregating in places such as the 
Metropolitan Club, to the finest museums such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art. In 
financial matters, they were the chief defenders of a gold standard to provide expanded 
stability and advocated for a Central bank, which they helped to organize eventually as a 
Federal Reserve System that closely cooperated with the Bank of England. In politics 
extension of what they deemed as best practices such as the gold standard, promoted 
138 
!
!
 
increased ties internationally with the formation of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
developed corporate friendly laws such as in New Jersey and heightened regulation to 
preserve a more stable business environment. 
As they were on corporate boards, Morgan partners were equally well represented 
in positions of power throughout the society in which they were entrusted. The key glue 
that held the balance together was trust; the House of Morgan was entrusted by the 
varying groups with an unprecedented amount of power. While leading industrialists such 
as Rockefeller and Carnegie had been known for cutthroat competition tactics when they 
first entered business, the House of Morgan alternatively chose the “gentlemen banker” 
model founded on a British code of honor that rather looked at a generally longer-term 
view and utilized cooperation. Its advantage over others was its pristine reputation built 
over generations. Seemingly low barriers to access within merchant banking were 
actually the opposite as new entrants had to forge trust over many years to build the 
various other forms of capital needed and hence the reason why such a high profit rate 
could exist for so many years.598 
Morgan’s partners firmly believed they were possessors of a “magnificent 
tradition” that needed to be shared with the world, both as a proactive measure of 
uplifting the populace and as a defensive measure to allow their fine tradition not to be 
submerged by competing cultures. Morgan’s partners were not just bankers. They were 
the leaders of a broader society which had many parts that they represented. It is 
important to note that companies represented by the House of Morgan did not suffer by 
the apparent conflict of interests. As the data has shown Morgan’s partners organized 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
598DeLong, “J.P. Morgan and His Money Trust,” 217. 
139 
!
!
 
companies generally had stronger financials, robust earnings and higher stock returns 
compared with the market and competitors. The House of Morgan represented its clients 
as a part of a broad community for the long term. A farming, steel, or telephone company 
was a part of a larger respective industry, which was within the US economy, a member 
of the international economy, and in turn was a part of the whole global society. 
In helping to organize a broader US society, the House of Morgan would interlock 
different subsystems, including finance, charity, and politics with business in the 
promotion of a more harmonious, predictable, and productive economy. Morgan’s 
partners had a clear goal of helping to create a large, global business operation that would 
belong in an oligopoly industry structure with high barriers to compete, ultimately 
manifesting in the contemporary multinational. Competition that had no central planning 
was ruinous in their eyes, wasting capital and promoting financial panics. It prevented the 
development of sustainable long-term planning for a stable economy. The large-cap 
multinational corporation in the US was formed largely through cooperation not 
competition. As trusted middlemen from the various parts of the economy, the House of 
Morgan was entrusted with not just the influence of an advisor but also with leading 
control to develop the new corporate structure. 
The social capital firms like the House of Morgan possessed were the 
underpinning of the trust they invested in new multinational to attract investors, the glue 
that conducted trade far-reaching around the world and allowed fractional reserve 
banking to exist. The gentlemen banker’s code that the Morgans adopted was wholly 
from London, as were community norms and practices. Morgan’s partners were selected 
for their leading social capital, which came from families of immense communal esteem 
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going back centuries. To enhance their societal position, they were leading pillars of the 
community, ranging from being the benefactors of the most exclusive culture to 
supporting the poor. They networked and interacted with others of comparable standing 
in posh private clubs that they helped largely to build and in which they were leading 
members. The environment had shared norms, similar religious beliefs, and common 
culture that fostered a trusting relationship. 
Given the leading positions throughout society, including in business, the 
reputation built and fostered was an important asset and underlined the trust they received 
from outsiders. Cooperation ruled the day in such an environment, even those such as the 
German-Jewish houses with a different social circle and religious beliefs, which had a 
very similar approach but applied to their sphere of society. The German-Jewish houses 
shared a similar social standing among its community. They were deeply involved in 
civic causes, were global in outlook, patrons of the fine arts, and very much involved in 
politics. Their perceived conflict was actually a strength in that both the Anglo-American 
and German-Jewish bankers could be in positions of clear leadership in their respective 
society and marshal resources accordingly. As financial-syndicate information has 
shown, collaboration not competition was the standard between the two societies. 
Financial capital would also play an integral role in the advancement of the 
multinational by providing the resources necessary to develop and operate a large-scale 
enterprise. The business had for generations been reliant on cooperation through 
syndicates and respect for the gentlemen banker’s code of not competing for other peers’ 
clients. By leveraging their syndicates in major economic centers, the House of Morgan 
raised needed capital to allow companies to expand and acquire new assets. With the 
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most liquid of exchanges and globally oriented investors, London provided the largest 
pool of resources. Morgan’s role as middleman extended far beyond just trade but in 
solving the issues that arose from separation of ownership, as trusted overseer of owners’ 
interests as board members and trustees of corporations. Future growth for companies 
was promoted through research and development centers, further acquisitions, and capital 
expenditures. The welfare of the worker became increasingly a business focus, with 
incentives tied to stock in community housing utilized. 
While trust coming from social capital provided a foundation for the economy, 
including the multinational to be built upon, political capital helped to provide for a more 
unified world, supportive laws increased predictability for investment and a safety net for 
business was fostered. At a macro level, the Morgan partners were instrumental in having 
a more integrated global economy based on gold and aimed at reducing business cycle 
volatility with the creation of the Federal Reserve System—after a long history as lenders 
of last resort. The sounder economy and solid business prospects helped bring down the 
cost of funding for multinationals. The Morgan partners also significantly aided trade in 
their role as leading merchant bankers, funded a transnational transportation system 
allowing for a mass production to have mass distribution system and bridged the gap 
between politics and business serving as the ambassadors from Wall Street. 
Domestically, they helped create new corporate regulation that promoted longer-term 
stability and helped construct laws that were friendly for development of industries. 
Cooperation was pivotal, whether it be working with leading politicians on both sides in 
creating regulation that managed big business or supporting the broader community of 
interest required by working together in different ways. 
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The social, cultural, political, and financial capital provided the overarching 
infrastructure of which the multinational was built. The Morgans sponsored a more 
globally integrated world through cooperation. Creation of the Federal Reserve, for 
example, evidenced cooperation among Wall Street and politicians with the desired 
shared outcome of a more stable economy. Likewise, US international policy of “Dollar 
Diplomacy” was cooperative, by improving US government goals. It advocated big 
business as well. A cooperative element was still seen in the cultural realm, ranging from 
caring for the poor, supporting education and endowing the arts as providing materialistic 
benefits for broader society but also raising the social standing of those involved. 
Cooperation had been working to meet shared goals, and now the strategy would be 
brought down to a micro level in  developing some of the multinational corporation’s 
most enduring qualities. 
The US by the coming of World War I would have the largest capitally intensive 
companies in the world with several different operating units that required massive 
capital. The money raised was used for operations, research and development, and 
expansion, with large capital expenditures’ projects controlled by Wall Street as 
gatekeepers. Institutions, by and large, did not become multiunit overnight through 
natural growth, but instead acquired other former competitors in a similar business, a 
supplier, or a distributor. The House of Morgan dominated merger activity with leading 
market share near the start of the 20th century, and acquisitions remain a still used 
strategy to diversify one’s business. Companies also went increasingly global in search of 
markets, through trade at first and later setting up operations directly overseas to support 
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their market. Morgan’s partners were among the leading merchant bankers fostering US 
trade and international development for companies to plant operations aboard. 
One of the biggest structural changes that happened was the separation of owners 
and managers. Capital markets provided a way to pool thousands of would-be owners—
over half a million in the United States by World War I—to purchase partial ownership in 
a company. These well-functioning global markets had been developed and tested for 
generations before by leading merchant banks such as the House of Morgan. The 
principal-agent issue raised by owners’ and managers’ being separated was relieved by 
the role Morgan’s partners played on corporate boards in being the trusted middlemen 
with ultimate control of the company’s strategic direction and allowing former, 
sometimes hostile competitors, which were now a part of the same company, to function. 
The House of Morgan fostered reliable information to be used by inside and external 
decision makers through the promotion of audits and production of financial statements. 
Promoting employee relations through programs that took care of needs to increasing 
incentives to work was also becoming a hallmark of the Morgan firms. 
In looking at case studies of some of the leading US multinationals being 
developed, we can see more clearly how the House of Morgan developed the 
multinational corporations, in case studies such as GE, International Harvester, 
International Mercantile Marine, and US Steel. The Morgan’s London branch had a long-
term connection with many of the most successful US founders since the time they 
started in operation. Andrew Carnegie’s relationship went back with the Morgans starting 
in 1868. Cyrus McCormick in 1851 had his reaper in an international exhibition of 
industrial products thanks to the House of Morgan, while Thomas Edison turned to the 
144 
!
!
 
Morgan partners to organize his new company and promote his products abroad. The 
House of Morgan was integral to all four in their respective mergers, and subsequent 
follow up corporate acquisitions. The firm dominated the process, from setting the 
valuation of assets and forming the financial syndicate in US Steel to selecting the entire 
board and management in International Harvester. 
The principal-agent problem was greatly reduced by the Morgan’s partners 
involvement both before and after the creation of the corporation. In the case of 
International Harvester, the two largest factions, the McCormicks and the Deerings, only 
agreed to merge by agreeing to have Morgan’s partner George W. Perkins have total 
control of the merger and development of operations. The International Mercantile 
Marine deal only went forward once the Morgan partners fully committed. In all the case 
studies, they had significant control on the board, such as US Steel’s entire board being 
selected by George W. Perkins. The management teams were also selected by Morgan’s 
partners. This was illustrated by replacing the leading management once they took over in 
all case study instances. 
The strategy that the four companies would run would be cooperation over 
competition. This was fostered by Judge Gary’s in US Steel’s having regular dinners with 
the leaders in the Steel industry while GE and its lead competitors were setting up 
arrangements to protect their local markets. Overseas expansion was promoted through 
banking and political connections alike. International Harvester leveraged connections 
with George Perkins in Russia; International Mercantile Marine was linked with the 
leading German competitors from the start while trading operations for US Steel in 
Europe were serviced by Morgan’s London arm. Education centers became a new way to 
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deal with the problem of a lack of a skilled workforce, as shown within GE. Dependable 
information became a staple for these four companies as well as financial statements and 
audits. Corporate welfare initiatives at International Harvester targeted women workers 
and the US Steel stock option program increased morale and public image. As 
International Mercantile Marine amply demonstrated, they did not have a perfect record. 
However, the returns to investors of the House of Morgan were generally well above the 
market, with the underlying companies boasting healthier financial balance sheets. 
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